CUR DEUS HOMO,

OR

'HY GOD WAS MADE MAN;

BY ST. ANSELM,

SOMETIME ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY:

atise shewing the Redemption of Mankind through the tonement made by the Incarnate Son of God to be consistent both with Divine Justice and Mercy, and also with the Reason of Man;

LATED, WITH AN INTRODUCTION CONTAINING SOME ACCOUNT OF THE AUTHOR, AND AN ANALYSIS OF THE WORK,

BY A CLERGYMAN.

"That He might be Just, and the Justifier of him which believeth in Jesus."—*Rom.* iii. 26.

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AUTHOR'S PREFACE.

THIS work having been counterfeited by some persons who, without my knowledge, copied out for themselves the first parts of it, before it had been completed and corrected, I have been compelled to finish it off as I best could, with more haste than was convenient to me, and so more brevity than I could wish; since there are many more things, which I have passed over in silence, that I should have put in and appended to the work, had liberty been given me of bringing it out in quiet, and at its proper season. For it was in great tribulation of heart (and from whom, and why I suffered this, God knows,) that I commenced it, when requested so to do, in England, and completed it while an exile in the province of Capua.

I have called it *Cur Deus Homo* after the subject-matter for the explanation of which it is published, and have divided it into two short books.

The first book contains the objections of unbelievers, who reject the Christian Faith because they think it contrary to reason; and then, Christ

being put out of the question, (as though nothing of Him had ever been,) it is proved by necessary reasons that it is impossible for any man to be saved without Him.

Similarly, in the second book, as though nothing concerning Christ were known, it is shewn by no less clear reasoning and truth that human nature was constituted to the end that the whole man, i.e. both in body and soul, might enjoy some time a blessed immortality; and that this end for which man was created must be effected by man; but it cannot except through a Man-God; and so it follows of necessity that all the things which we believe concerning Christ must take place.

This little Preface, together with the heads of the whole work, I beg all who wish to copy out this book to prefix before the commencement of it; so that into whosesoever hands it may fall, he may see at a glance on its fore-front (so to speak) whether there be anything in the whole body of the work which he should regard with attention.

CUR DEUS HOMO.

BOOK I.

CHAPTER I.

THE QUESTION ON WHICH THE WHOLE MATTER DEPENDS.

I HAVE been oftentimes, and very earnestly, requested by many, both by word of mouth and by letter, to commit to writing, so that they may be remembered, the reasons for certain points of our faith which I am in the habit of giving to those who inquire of me; for they say they are pleased with them, and they think they are satisfied by them. And they request this of me, not that they may by reasoning attain to faith, but that they may derive pleasure by understanding and meditating on those things they do already believe; and also may be, as far as possible, ready always to satisfy any one who asketh a reason of the hope that is in us.

The question which unbelievers who deride the simplicity of Christianity as foolish are accustomed to object to us, and which many of the faithful turn over in their minds, is this, viz., what reason or necessity was there for God to have been made Man, and by His death, as

we believe and confess, to have restored life to the world; whereas He might have done this either by another person—an angel or a man—or by a mere act of His own will? Of this question not only learned, but even many unlearned men, seek and wish to find the solution. Since, therefore, many desire a treatise on it, and although in the inquiry it may seem very difficult, yet in the solution it is intelligible to all, and besides, the task is pleasing on account of its usefulness and the beauty of the reasoning; notwithstanding, too, that sufficient has been said upon it by the holy Fathers, yet still I will take pains to make clear to inquirers what God has deigned to unfold to me on the subject. And since that which is sifted by question and answer is made more clear to many, and especially the less acute intellects, and on that account is more acceptable to them, I shall, out of those who discuss this question, take one who very strongly urges me to commence this work as disputing with me, so that *Boso* may question, and *Anselm* may answer, thus.

CHAPTER II.

HOW WHAT IS ABOUT TO BE SAID HERE IS TO BE RECEIVED.

Boso. As due order requires that we should believe the deep things of the Christian faith before we presume to discuss them by our reason, so it appears to me a neglect of duty if, after that we are established in the faith, we do not take pains to understand what we believe. Wherefore since, by the grace of God preventing

me, I think I hold so firmly the faith of our redemption, that even were I unable to comprehend by any reasoning what I believe, still nothing would be able to tear me from its firm basis: for this very reason I beg of you to explain to me what, as you know, many enquire of me, viz., what necessity or reason was there that God, since He is Omnipotent, should have taken upon Him the lowliness and infirmity of human nature in order to its restoration?

Anselm. What you ask of me is far beyond me, and on this account I am afraid of treating of things which are too high for me, lest haply some one, when he has fancied, or even perceived, that I do not satisfy him, should imagine that the truth of the fact was lacking to me, rather than that my understanding was insufficient to grasp it.

Boso. You ought not to be afraid of this, but on the contrary to remember, that it frequently happens in discoursing on any question, that God unfolds what He had before concealed; you ought also to trust in the grace of God, that if you freely impart what you have freely received, you will be counted worthy to receive those higher things which you have not yet attained to.

Anselm. There is also another cause for which I see that it will be hardly possible, if at all, to treat fully on this matter which is before us; for to do so it is necessary to have a knowledge of the nature of *power*, *necessity*, *will*, and certain other things which are so circumstanced that no one of them can be considered fully without the others; and to treat them thus requires a work of itself, not very easy, as it seems to me, and yet not altogether useless, for ignorance

about them makes some things difficult which by knowledge become easy.

Boso. On these points you can speak briefly in their proper place, so that we may have what shall suffice for the present work, and what more has to be said we may defer to another time.

Anselm. There is another consideration which makes me draw back very much from your request. The subject is not only of great importance, but in that it is of One in excellence more exalted than the sons of men, so also it requires reasoning exalted above the intellect of men. For this reason I am afraid lest, even as I am often indignant with unskilful artists when I see our Lord Himself painted with a deformed figure, so it may happen to myself if I presume to deface so glorious a subject with an uncultivated and contemptible style of speaking.

Boso. Yet not even this ought to deter you. Because, as you allow any one who can to say the things in a better manner, so you do not prevent any one who is displeased with your style from writing in more polished language. But, that I may cut short all your excuses, I ask you to do this not for the learned, but for me, and those who make the request with me.

Anselm. Well, since I see your importunity and theirs who with you make this request out of charity and pious zeal, I will try to the utmost of my power (by the help of God and your prayers, which you who ask this of me have to this end often promised me) not so much to shew you what you are in search of, as to search with you. I wish, however, all that I say to be received on these terms, viz., that if I shall have

made any statement unconfirmed by a greater authority, although I may seem to have proved it by reason, yet that it be not received with any other certainty than that it appears to me at present to be thus, until God shew it me more clearly to be otherwise. Because if I shall have been in some measure able to answer your question satisfactorily, it ought to follow as a certainty that one wiser than I am would be able to do this more fully; nay, it must be allowed that whatever any man is able to say or know on the subject, yet higher reasons for so great a thing still remain undiscovered.

Boso. And therefore to be discovered, to use the words of unbelievers: for it is right that, when we study to inquire a reason for our faith, we should bring forward the objections of those who are by no means willing to come to the same faith without reason. For although they ask for a reason because they do not believe, and we because we do, yet it is one and the same thing which we ask; and if you make any answer which sacred authority appears to oppose, I am at liberty to bring it forward so that you may explain how it does not really oppose.

Anselm. Say what you think fit.

CHAPTER III.

THE OBJECTIONS OF UNBELIEVERS, AND THE ANSWERS OF THE FAITHFUL.

Boso. Unbelievers, who scoff at our simplicity, object to us, that we do God an injury and insult when

we assert that He came down into the womb of the Virgin, that He was born of a woman, that He grew up on the nourishment of milk and man's food; and, not to speak of many other things which do not seem befitting the Deity, He underwent weariness, hunger, thirst, stripes, and the cross, and death between the thieves.

Anselm. We do not do God any injury or insult, but we give Him thanks with all our heart; we praise, and we publish the unspeakable depth of His mercy, in that so wonderfully and beyond conception, out of so many, and great, and deserved evils under which we lay, He has restored us to so many and great undeserved good things which we had lost, and has thus manifested His greater love and goodness toward us. For if they would diligently consider how fitting it is that the restoration of man should be brought about in this way, they would not scoff at our simplicity, but would praise with us the wisdom and goodness of God. Since it was right that, as by man's disobedience death passed upon the human race, so by the obedience of Man should life be restored. And like as sin, which was the cause of our condemnation, had its beginning from a woman, so should the Author of our righteousness and salvation be born of a woman; and as the devil, by the tasting of a tree overcame man whom he persuaded to do it, so by the Passion on the Tree, which he brought about, should he be overcome by Man. There are also many other things which, when carefully considered, manifest the unspeakable harmony of our redemption effected in this way.

CHAPTER IV.

THAT THESE ANSWERS APPEAR TO UNBELIEVERS NOT OF NECESSARY CONSEQUENCE, AND, AS IT WERE, MERE PICTURES.

Boso. All these things it must be allowed are beautiful, and like certain pictures, but if there be not something solid on which they rest, they do not seem to satisfy unbelievers why we ought to believe that it was God's will to suffer what we say He did. For he who makes a painting, chooses some solid substance on which to paint, so that what he paints may endure. For no one paints on water or on air, because on them no traces of the picture would remain. Wherefore, when we put forward these coincidences which you mention, they are to unbelievers but pictures of facts, since they are of opinion that it is not a real fact, but a mere figment that we believe, and think we, as it were, paint upon a cloud. There must, therefore, first be shewn a reasonable foundation of truth, that is to say, a necessity which may prove that it was right or even possible for God to humble Himself to those things which we have before mentioned. And then, that the body, as it were, of truth may be more beautiful, those coincidences may be set forth as colourings to the body.

Anselm. Does it not seem a sufficiently necessary reason why God should do what we say He did, when we consider that the whole human race, that so precious work of His, was utterly lost; that it was not fitting that what God had purposed for man should come entirely to an end, and that that same purpose of His

could not be effected unless the human race were set free by its Creator Himself?

CHAPTER V.

THAT THE REDEMPTION OF MAN COULD NOT BE EFFECTED BY ANY OTHER THAN BY THE PERSON OF GOD.

Boso. This same deliverance, if it could in any way be said to have been effected by any other than the Person of God, (either by an angel or a man,) the human mind would much more readily receive it. For God was able to make a man without sin, not indeed from the sinful lump [of fallen nature], nor from any man, but like as He made Adam, and by such an one it would seem He might have effected the same work.

Anselm. Do not you perceive that if any other person were to redeem a man from eternal death, the redeemed man would be rightly judged to be his servant? And if this had so happened, man would by no means have been restored to that dignity which would have been his had he not sinned, since he who would otherwise have been servant to none but God, and equal to the angels in all things, would thus become servant to one who was not God, and to whom the angels were not subject.

CHAPTER VI.

HOW UNBELIEVERS FIND FAULT WITH US FOR SAYING THAT GOD REDEEMED US BY HIS OWN DEATH, AND THUS MANIFESTED HIS LOVE TOWARD US, AND THAT HE CAME TO OVERCOME THE DEVIL FOR US.

Boso. This is what they wonder at so much, that we call this redemption our deliverance. For, say they, in what captivity, in what prison, in whose power were you held, from which God could not have delivered you except by redeeming with such labours, and at last with His own blood? And when we tell them He redeemed us from our sins, from His own wrath, from hell, and from the power of the devil, whom He came to fight and conquer for us, because we were unable to do so ourselves; He also re-purchased for us the kingdom of heaven, and by doing all this in this manner, He shews us how much He loved us;—when we tell them this, they answer, If you say that God, who you tell us created all things by a word, was unable to do all this by a simple command, you refute yourselves by making Him not Almighty. Or if you confess that He was *able*, but not *willing* to do it, except in this way, how will you shew Him to be wise, whom you affirm to have suffered without any reason things so unbefitting Him? For all these things which you bring forward depend upon His will; for the wrath of God is nothing else than His will to punish. If, therefore, He does not will to punish the sins of men, man is free from his sins, from the wrath of God, from hell, and from the power of the devil, all which things he suffers

on account of his sins; he also receives what he was deprived of on account of the same sins. For in whose power is hell, or the devil, or whose is the kingdom of heaven, but His who made all things? Whatever things, therefore, you either dread or look forward to with longing, these are subject to His will which nothing can resist. Wherefore, if He were unwilling that the human race should be saved, except in that way which you speak of, when He could do it by His simple will, see how, to say the least, you oppose His wisdom. For if a man were without any reason to do that with great labour which he could have done with ease, he would certainly not be judged wise by any one.

And forasmuch as you tell us that God thus shewed you how much He loved you, this is not to be defended with any reason, unless it be shewn that man could not have been saved any other way. For if he could not in any other way, then perhaps there would have been a necessity for Him to shew His love in this way. But now, when He could have saved man in some other way, what reason is there that, for the sake of shewing His love, He should do and suffer what you say He did? Does He not, then, shew to the good angels how much He loves them, though for them He does not suffer such things? And as to what you say of His coming to fight for you against the devil, with what sense dare you bring this forward? Does not God's omnipotence reign everywhere? How, then, for the conquest of the devil must God needs come down from heaven? These are what unbelievers seem able to object against us.

CHAPTER VII.

THAT THE DEVIL HAD NO JUST CAUSE (*justitiam*) AGAINST MAN: HOW IT IS THAT HE MAY SEEM TO HAVE HAD, AND WHY GOD SHOULD HAVE DELIVERED MAN IN THIS WAY.

But that other reason we are accustomed to give, to wit, that it was necessary (*debuisse*) for God, in order to deliver man, to contend against the devil by righteousness, before that He did so by might; so that, since the devil had slain Him in whom there was no cause of death, and who was God, he should justly lose that power which he had over sinners, otherwise God would have done him an injustice, since he held possession of man justly, for he had not taken him captive by violence, but the said man had given himself up to him of his own accord.

This argument, then, I do not see the force of. For if the devil or man had been their own, or had belonged to any one else than God, or had remained in any one else's power than God's, perhaps this argument might be rightly used; but when neither the devil nor man belong to any one else but God, and out of the power of God neither of them exist, what cause is there for God of necessity to plead with His own, concerning His own, and in His own, but merely to punish His servant, who persuaded his fellow-servant to forsake their common Lord and go over to him, and as a traitor had received the runaway, as a thief a fellow-thief, together with what he had stolen from his Lord? For each of them was a thief, since the one, at the other's persuasion, had stolen himself from his Lord. If God were to act thus, what

could be done with greater justice? Or if God, the Judge of all, were to take man, who is, as we see, His own possession, out of the power of one who so unjustly takes possession of him, whether for the purpose of punishing him in some other way than by the instrumentality of the devil, or for the purpose of sparing him, what injustice would there be in this, — since, although it be just for man to be tormented by the devil, yet the devil would be unjust in tormenting him? Man, indeed, deserved to be punished, and by none more fitly than by him at whose persuasion he had consented to sin. But the devil never merited any right to punish him, nay, he would do this with the greater degree of injustice, in that he was not drawn to it by any love of justice, but was impelled by the instinct of malice. For he did not do this at God's command, but in His incomprehensible wisdom, who ord reth well even evil things, by God's permission.

And I suppose that they who think that the devil has some just claims to the possession of man, are led to this opinion because they see it is just that man should be delivered up to be tormented by the devil, and just that God should permit this, and on that account they suppose that it is just that the devil should bring that torment upon man. For it happens sometimes that the same thing viewed in different aspects is both just and unjust, and for this reason is pronounced by those who do not closely look into it, to be either altogether just or altogether unjust. For instance, it happens that a man strikes an innocent man unjustly, for which he justly deserves to be struck himself; still, if the man struck ought not to avenge himself, and yet does strike

the man who struck him, he does this unjustly,—since this blow on the part of him who returns the blow is unjust, because he ought not to have avenged himself, but on the part of him who is struck it is just, because by unjustly striking another he justly deserves to be struck himself. Therefore in different aspects the same action is both just and unjust, because it may happen to be pronounced entirely just by one or entirely unjust by another. Hence, in this manner the devil is said to torment man justly, because God permits this justly, and man suffers it justly. Here, however, where man is said to suffer justly, he is not said to suffer justly by reason of his own justice (*sua justitia*), but because he is punished by the just judgment of God.

But if that handwriting of ordinances which the Apostle says was against us, and was blotted out by the death of Christ, be objected, and any one think that by that is meant that the devil might, by the handwriting of a certain agreement in justice, exact from man sin as interest for that first sin to which he persuaded him, and also as the penalty for sin, so that by this he would seem to prove his just claims upon man,—I by no means admit it to be so understood. For that handwriting is not the devil's, because it is called the handwriting of ordinances. But the ordinances are not the devil's, but God's. Since by the just judgment of God they were ordained, and as it were confirmed by the handwriting, so that man, who had willingly sinned, could by himself avoid neither sin nor the penalty of sin; for "he is a wind that passeth away and cometh not again," and "he who committeth sin is the servant of sin;" neither ought he who sins to be let go un-

punished, unless mercy spare the sinner, set him free, and restore him. Wherefore we ought not to believe that by this handwriting can be discovered any just cause on the devil's part for his tormenting of man.

In fact, as in a good angel there is no unrighteousness whatever, so in an evil angel there is no righteousness at all. There was therefore in the devil no righteous cause why God should not for the deliverance of man put forth His strength against him.

CHAPTER VIII.

HOW, ALTHOUGH THE HUMILIATIONS WHICH WE ATTRIBUTE TO CHRIST DO NOT BELONG TO HIS GODHEAD, YET IT SEEMS TO UNBELIEVERS UNFITTING (*inconveniens*) THAT THEY SHOULD BE ATTRIBUTED TO HIM AS MAN; AND HENCE THE SAME MAN SEEMS TO THEM NOT TO HAVE DIED OF HIS OWN WILL.

Anselm. The will of God ought to suffice us for a reason when He does a thing, although we may not see why He so wills it, for the will of God is never unreasonable.

Boso. That is true, if it be admitted that God *did* will the way in which it is done. Many, however, will by no means allow that God wills a thing, if it seem contrary to reason.

Anselm. What does there seem to you contrary to reason, in our confessing that God willed those things which we believe in concerning His Incarnation?

Boso. To speak briefly, it seems contrary to reason

High should stoop to such humiliations, Almighty should do anything with such .

ey who say this, understand not what 'or the Divine nature we assert without ıpassible, neither can it in any way be ts loftiness, nor can anything which it toil to it. But we say that our Lord very God and very Man, one Person in l two Natures in one Person. Where- y that God suffered any humiliation or not understand this of the loftiness nature, but of the infirmity of the which He took; and thus it is mani- ı no way contradicts our faith. For in this we do not signify any humiliation of the Divine substance, but we shew that there is one Person of God and Man. In God's Incarnation, therefore, no humiliation of His nature is understood to have taken place, but man's nature is believed to be exalted.

Boso. Be it so: nothing, then, is to be taken as applied to the Divine nature which is said of Christ after the infirmity of His human nature. But still, how can it be proved just or reasonable for God to have allowed that Man, whom the Father called His own beloved Son, in whom He was always well pleased, and whom the Son caused Himself to be, so to treat Himself, and be treated by others? For what justice is there in delivering up to death instead of a sinner, a Man of all men the most just? What man would not be judged worthy of condemnation if he were to condemn an innocent person, in order that he might set a

guilty one free? The case is therefore reduced to the same degree of unfitness (*inconveniens*) as was mentioned above. For if He were able to save sinners in no other way than by condemning a just Man, where is His omnipotence? but if He were able, but not willing, how shall we defend His wisdom and justice?

Anselm. God the Father did not, in the way you seem to understand it, treat that Man; nor did He deliver to death an innocent person instead of a guilty one. For He did not compel Him to die, or allow Him to be slain against His will; but the same Man, Himself, underwent death of His own free will, that He might save man.

Boso. Well, though it were not against His will, since He consented to the will of the Father, yet in some sense He appears to have compelled Him, by commanding Him to do it. For it is said that Christ "humbled Himself, and became obedient" to the Father, "unto death, even the death of the Cross. For which cause God also hath highly exalted Him[a];" and that "He learned obedience by the things which He suffered[b];" and that the Father "spared not His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all[c]." And the same Son says, "I came not to do Mine own will, but the will of Him that sent Me[d]." And when about to enter on His Passion, He says, "As the Father gave Me commandment, even so I do[e];" also, "the cup which My Father hath given Me, shall I not drink it[f]?" And elsewhere: "Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from Me: nevertheless, not as I will, but as Thou wilt[g]."

[a] Phil. ii. 8, 9. [b] Heb. v. 8. [c] Rom. viii. 32. [d] John vi. 38.
[e] John xiv. 31. [f] John xviii. 11. [g] Matt. xxvi. 36.

And again: "Father, if this cup may not pass away from Me, except I drink it, Thy will be done[h]." In all these places Christ appears to have undergone death rather from obedience compelling Him, than from His own will disposing Him to it.

CHAPTER IX.

THAT HE DIED OF HIS OWN FREE WILL; AND HOW IT IS THAT "HE WAS MADE OBEDIENT UNTO DEATH;" AND "FOR WHICH CAUSE GOD EXALTED HIM;" AND "I CAME NOT TO DO MINE OWN WILL;" AND "HE SPARED NOT HIS OWN SON;" AND "NOT AS I WILL, BUT AS THOU WILT."

Anselm. You do not, I think, clearly distinguish between what He did from obedience requiring it, and what was done to Him because He kept His obedience, which He underwent, though obedience did not require it.

Boso. I must have you explain this more clearly.

Anselm. Why did the Jews persecute Him even unto death?

Boso. For nothing else but that in His life and conversation He invariably held fast truth and justice.

Anselm. And this, I suppose, because God requires it of every rational creature, which is bound to do it from obedience to God?

Boso. So we must confess.

Anselm. This obedience, therefore, that Man owed to God the Father, and the human nature to the Divine; and this the Father required of Him.

Boso. No one doubts this.

[h] Matt. xxvi. 39.

Anselm. Here, then, you have what He did from obedience requiring it.

Boso. True; and now I see that whatever was brought upon Him, because He persevered in obeying, He underwent. For death was brought upon Him because He persisted in obedience, and this He underwent; but how obedience should not require this, I do not understand.

Anselm. If man had never sinned, ought he to have suffered death, or ought God to have required death of him?

Boso. As we believe, man would neither have died, nor would death have been required of him: but I wish to hear from you the reason of this.

Anselm. You do not deny that the rational creature was made just, and for this end, viz., that it might be blessed with the enjoyment of God?

Boso. No; I admit that.

Anselm. But you will not surely think it befitting God that He should compel, without any fault of its own, that to be miserable which He had made just, in order that it might be blessed: for, for a man to die against his will is to be miserable.

Boso. It is clear, that if man had not sinned, God would not justly have required death of him.

Anselm. God therefore did not compel Christ, in whom was no sin, to die; but He Himself of His own will underwent death, not from obedience requiring Him to forsake life, but because obedience required Him to keep righteousness, in which He so constantly persevered, that by it He incurred death. It may also be said that the Father commanded Him to die, since

He commanded that by which He incurred death. Thus then, "as the Father gave Him commandment, even so He did;" and "the cup which He gave Him. He drank;" and He "was made obedient" to the Father "unto death;" and so "learned He obedience by the things which He suffered,"—i.e., He learned how far obedience should be kept. For the word which is used, "He learned," may be understood in two senses; for "He learned" means either He made others to learn, or that He learned by experience that which by knowledge He was not ignorant of before. But when the Apostle had said, "He humbled Himself, and became obedient unto death, even the death of the Cross," he added this: "wherefore God also hath highly exalted Him, and given Him a Name which is above every name." Similar to which is what David said: "He shall drink of the brook in the way, therefore shall He lift up His Head[i]." This, then, is not so spoken as though He could in no way have attained that exaltation, except by this obedience unto death; and that exaltation were conferred on Him solely as a reward for this obedience. For before He had suffered, He said that "all things had been delivered to Him of the Father[k]," and that "all that the Father had were His[l]." But since He Himself, with the Father and the Holy Ghost, had ordained that He would not but by His death display to the world the greatness of His power: when, therefore, what had been ordained to be done no otherwise than by that death, is done by it, it is not improperly said to be done on account of it.

For if we intend to do a thing, but purpose to do

[i] Ps. cx. 7. [k] Matt. xi. 27. [l] John xvi. 15.

something else first, by which the other may come to pass; when now that which we wished to precede it has been done, if what we intended takes place, it is rightly said to be done *on account of this*, since that which delayed its accomplishment has been done; because it had been purposed not to be accomplished, except through the means of the latter. For instance, a river, which I may cross either on horseback or by boat, I resolve that I will not cross except by boat; and on this account delay crossing, because the boat is not there: when now the boat comes, if I cross, it is rightly said of me, The boat was ready, and *therefore* he crossed over. And we speak thus not only when it is by means of that which we resolved should precede it, but even when it is not by means of, but only after that, that we resolve to do anything else. For instance, if a man puts off taking food, because he has not yet that day been to the celebration of the Holy Eucharist; when he has accomplished what he had made up his mind to do first, it is not improperly said to him, Take your food now, *because* you have now done that for which you put off taking it. Far less strange a mode of expression is it, when Christ is said to be exalted *on account of* His having undergone death, by means of which, and after which, He had determined to bring about that exaltation. This may be understood also in the way in which we read that the same Lord "increased in wisdom and favour with God[m];" not that it was so literally, but that He so acted as if it had been so. For He was exalted after that death, as though He had been so on account of it.

[m] Luke ii. 52.

Again, when He says, "I came not to do Mine own will, but the will of Him that sent Me," it is just like that other word, "My doctrine is not Mine[a];" for what a man has not from himself, but from God, that he ought to call not so much his own, as God's. For no man hath the truth which he teaches, or the righteous will which he exercises from himself, but from God. Hence Christ came to do not His own will, but His Father's; because the righteous will which He had was not from His human, but from His Divine nature.

But that "God spared not His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all," is nothing else than that He did not rescue Him. We find many instances of this sort in Holy Scripture.

Again, where He says, "Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from Me; nevertheless, not as I will, but as Thou wilt;" and "if this cup may not pass away from Me except I drink it, Thy will be done;" He signifies by His own will the natural desire for safety, by which His human flesh shrank from the pain of death. But again, He speaks of His Father's will, not that the Father willed the death of the Son, rather than His life; but that the Father willed that the human race should not be restored, unless man should do some act as great as was that death. And because reason did not require that of Him which no one else could do, therefore the Son says that He willed His own death, since He chose rather to suffer it, than that the human race should not be saved; as though He were to say, "Since Thou willest not that the reconciliation of the world should be accomplished in any

[a] John vii. 16.

other way, I say that Thou in this way willest My Death: let Thy will then be done, i e., let My death take place, that so the world may be reconciled to Thee."

For we often say that a man wills a thing, because he does not will another thing, which if he did, what he is said to will would not take place: as when we say that a man is willing to put out the candle, when he will not shut the window, through which the wind comes in which puts out the candle. Thus, then, the Father willed the death of the Son, because He willed that the world should only be saved by man doing some act as great as I have just mentioned. And this was to the Son who willed the salvation of men, since no other man was able to do it, the same as if the Father had commanded Him to die; and hence, "as the Father gave Him commandment, even so He did;" and "the cup which the Father gave Him He drank," being "obedient even unto death."

CHAPTER X.

AGAIN, ON THE SAME QUESTIONS; HOW THEY MAY BE RIGHTLY UNDERSTOOD IN ANOTHER WAY.

It may also be rightly understood that, by that pious will of His, by which the Son was willing to die for the salvation of the world, "the Father gave Him" (not, however, compulsorily) "the commandment," and "the cup" of His Passion; that by it also He "spared Him not, but gave Him up for us," and willed His Death; and that the Son Himself "became obedient unto death," and "learned obedience by the things

which He suffered." For like as, according to His human nature, He had not the will to live righteously from Himself, but from the Father: so also that will, by which (in order to do us a greater good) He willed to die, He could not have had but from "the Father of Lights," from whom cometh "every good and perfect gift;" and as the Father is said to draw by giving, the will [to come]; so it is not an improper expression if He be asserted to impel. For as the Son saith of the Father, "No man cometh unto Me, except the Father draw him[o];" so He might have said, "except the Father impel him." Similarly, He might have shewn no man hasteneth to death for My Name's sake, except the Father hath impelled him, or drawn him. For since every man is drawn or impelled by his will to do that which he undeviatingly wills, God is not inaptly said to draw or impel, when He gives such a will; though in this drawing or impelling no violent necessity is understood, but a willing and loving holding fast to the good will which has been received. If, then, it cannot be denied that in this manner the Father, by the gift of that good will, did draw or impel the Son to death; who does not perceive, that by this means He "gave Him the commandment" to undergo death willingly; and that He "gave Him the cup," which He drank not unwillingly? And if the Son be rightly said to have spared not Himself, but of His own free will to have given Himself up for us; who can say that it is not rightly said that "the Father," from whom He had this will, "spared Him not, but gave Him up for us," and willed His death? Thus also was it by unwaver-

[o] John vi. 44.

ingly and willingly keeping the will He received from the Father, that the Son was "made obedient" to Him, even "unto death;" and "learned, from the things which He suffered, obedience;" i.e., how great things may be done by obedience. For then only is there true and unfeigned obedience, when a reasonable nature, not by necessity, but of its own accord, keeps the will received by it from God.

We may also in various other ways understand how it was that the Father willed the death of the Son, although what have been mentioned may suffice. For as we say that he wills a thing who causes another to will it, so also we say that he wills a thing who, though he does not cause another to will it, yet approves of him because he wills it: as, for instance, when we see a man bravely suffer misfortune, in order that he may accomplish a good end which he wills; although we confess that we wish him to bear that penalty, yet we do not wish, or love, the penalty he undergoes, but his will to undergo it. He also who can forbid a thing taking place, and does not, we are accustomed to say wills what he does not forbid. Since, therefore, the will of the Son was pleasing to the Father, and He did not forbid Him either to have that will, or to perform what He willed; it is rightly affirmed that He willed that the Son should undergo a death so pious and so beneficial in its results, although He did not love the penalty itself which He incurred.

Again, He said that "the cup could not pass from Him except He drank it:" not that He could not have avoided death, if He had wished; but since, as has been said, it was impossible for the world to be saved by any

other means, He unwaveringly wished rather to suffer death, than that the world should not be saved. But the reason why He said those words was, to teach us that the human race could not be saved in any other way than by His death, and not to shew that He counted as of no consequence the avoiding of death. Whatever things like these which have been mentioned are said of Him, are thus to be explained, so that He may be understood to have died not from any necessity, but of His own free will. For He was Almighty, and of Him it is written, that "He was offered because He Himself willed it," (*oblatus est, quia ipse voluit*,—Vulg., Is. liii. 7). And He says Himself, "I lay down My life, that I may take it again; no man taketh it from Me, but I lay it down of Myself: I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it again[p]." Therefore, what He does by His own power, and by His own will, He can by no means be rightly said to be compelled to do.

Boso. This one point, though, that God permitted Him, even though willing, to be so treated, does not seem a mode of dealing befitting such a Father with such a Son.

Anselm. Nay, on the contrary, it is most befitting such a Father to consent to such a Son in His will to do an act that shall redound to the honour of God, and prove the cause of the salvation of men, which could not be accomplished any other way.

Boso. On this point we are as yet at issue, viz., how can it be shewn that that death was reasonable or necessary? Since if it were not, it seems that it would

[p] John x. 17, 18.

neither have been right for the Son to have willed it, nor for the Father to have required or permitted it. The question therefore is, why could not God have saved man in some other way; or if He could, why did He will this way? Now it not only seems unbefitting God to have saved man in this way, but also it does not appear of what avail that death was for the salvation of man. For it is a strange thing for God so to delight in, or stand in need of, the blood of an innocent person, as that without his being slain He would not, or could not, spare the guilty.

Anselm. Since in this question you accept the position of those who will believe nothing before it has been demonstrated by reason, I will make this compact with you, viz., that none, not even the least unfitness or contradiction, be allowed by us to have place in God; and also that no reason, not even the weakest, unless a stronger oppose it, be rejected. For as any unfitness or contradiction, however small, with God involves *impossibility;* so any reason, however small, unless it be contradicted by a greater, involves *necessity.*

Boso. Most willingly do I accept this compact to be observed by both of us in this matter.

Anselm. The question is then only of the Incarnation of God, and of the things which we believe of Him after He became Man.

Boso. It is so.

Anselm. Let us suppose, then, that the Incarnation of God, and the things we say of Him as Man, had never taken place; and let it be agreed between us, that man was formed for blessedness, which cannot be had in this life; also, that no one can attain to that blessed-

ness but after forgiveness of his sins; that no man can pass through this life without sin; and that some faith in these things is necessary to eternal salvation.

Boso. Be it so; for nothing in this appears unbefitting God, or impossible to God.

Anselm. The remission of sins then is necessary to man, in order that he may attain to blessedness.

Boso. So we all hold.

CHAPTER XI.

WHAT IS IT TO SIN, AND TO MAKE SATISFACTION FOR SIN.

Anselm. We must therefore inquire, for what reason God does forgive men their sins; and that we may make this more clear, let us first see what it is to sin, and what it is to make satisfaction for sin.

Boso. It is your place to explain, and mine to attend.

Anselm. If either angel or man had always rendered to God what they owed, they would neither have ever sinned.

Boso. I cannot say anything to the contrary.

Anselm. To sin, therefore, is nothing else than not to render to God His due.

Boso. What is that debt which is due from us to God?

Anselm. The entire will of a rational creature ought to be subject to the will of God.

Boso. True enough.

Anselm. This is the debt which both angel and man owe to God, as long as he pays which no one

sins; and every one who does not pay this, sins. This is righteousness or rectitude of will, which makes us just or right in heart, i.e., in will; this is the sole and entire honour which we owe to God, and which God requires of us. For such a will, when it can be exercised alone, does works well pleasing to God; because without it no work is pleasing to Him. He who does not render to God this honour which is due to Him, robs God of what is His own, and dishonours God; and this is what it is to sin. Moreover, so long as he does not pay that of which he has robbed Him, he continues in his fault; and it is not enough to restore God only what he has taken away, but he ought also, to make amends for the insult done to God, to restore more than he took away. For as it is not sufficient, for one who injures the health of another, to restore him to that health, unless he also make some amends for the injury he has done by causing him pain; so he who wrongs the honour of any one, does not do enough when he restores his honour, unless, according to the mischief done by dishonouring him, he restores something to please him whom he has dishonoured. It must also be noticed, that when a man pays what he has taken away unjustly, he ought to give what could not have been required of him, had he not stolen what was another's. So, therefore, is every one who sins bound to pay back the honour of which he has robbed God; and this is the satisfaction which every sinner is bound to make to God.

Boso. To all this, as we agreed to follow reason, I have nothing to object, although you somewhat terrify me.

CHAPTER XII.

WHETHER IT WOULD BE FITTING FOR GOD TO REMIT SINS BY MERCY ALONE, WITHOUT ANY PAYMENT OF THE DEBT.

Anselm. Let us go back to the subject, and see whether it would be fitting for God to remit sins by mercy alone, without any payment of the debt.

Boso. I do not see why it would not.

Anselm. To forgive sin thus is simply not to punish it; and since it is rightly ordered that sin without satisfaction only exists but to be punished, if it be not punished, it is remitted out of order.

Boso. What you say is reasonable.

Anselm. But it is not fitting for God to remit anything out of order in His kingdom.

Boso. I fear I shall be guilty of sin if I even wished to contradict that.

Anselm. Therefore it is not fitting for God to remit sin thus unpunished; for then God would be regarding as alike one who sins and one who does not; which is not consistent with God.

Boso. I cannot deny it.

Anselm. Note this also: Every one knows the righteousness of men to be under some law, so that it may be recompensed with a measure of reward according to its quantity, more or less.

Boso. So we believe.

Anselm. But if sin is neither atoned for nor punished, it is subject to no law.

Boso. I cannot otherwise suppose it.

Anselm. Therefore unrighteousness, if it be remitted by mercy alone, is more free than righteousness; which

seems very inconsistent. Nay, this inconsistency extends further, even to this—that it makes unrighteousness to be like God; because, as God is subject to no law, so likewise is unrighteousness.

Boso. I cannot resist your reasoning: but when God commands us to forgive altogether those who sin against us, it seems a contradiction that He should command us to do this which it is not fitting for Him to do Himself.

Anselm. There is no contradiction in this; because God commands us this in order that we may not presume upon what belongs to God alone. For to take vengeance belongeth to none but to Him who is the Lord of all; since, when earthly powers do this rightly, it is God Himself, by whom they are ordained for this very thing, who does it.

Boso. You have removed the contradiction which I thought existed: but there is another point on which I wish to have your answer, viz., since God is so free as to be subject to no law, and no one's judgment, and yet so kind as that nothing more kind can be conceived than He is, and since nothing is right or proper but what He wills; it seems strange for us to say that He by no means wishes, or that it is not lawful for Him, to forgive injury done to Himself, when it is from Him, that we are accustomed to ask forgiveness of those offences we commit against others.

Anselm. It is true what you say of His freedom, of His will, and of His kindness; but we ought so reasonably to understand these, as not to seem to militate against His dignity. For with Him there is no freedom, but to do what is expedient or what is fitting;

neither is that to be called kindness which brings to pass anything unbefitting God. But in that it is said that what He wills is just, and what He wills not is not just; this is not to be understood as though, if God were to will anything inconsistent, it would be just because He willed it. For if God were to will to lie, it does not follow that it is just to lie, but rather that he who so wills is not God. For to will to lie can in no way be the will of any one, except that will in which truth is corrupted; nay, which is corrupted by forsaking truth. When, therefore, it is said, "if God were to will to lie," it is the same as saying, "if God were of a nature that would will to lie;" consequently, it does not follow that falsehood is just, unless it be understood like as when we say of two impossible things, "If this is, then that is;" when neither this nor that really are: as if one were to say, "If water is dry, then also is fire wet;" for neither is true. So also it is only true to say, "If God wills this, it is just," of those things which it is not inconsistent for God to will. For if God will it to rain, it is just that it should rain; and if God wills a man to be slain, it is just that he should be slain. Wherefore, if it be not fitting for God to do anything unjustly, or out of order, it does not belong to His freedom, or His kindness, or His will, to let go unpunished the sinner who does not pay that of which He has robbed God.

Boso. You have removed all that I thought could be objected against you.

Anselm. Mark now why it would not be right for God to do this.

Boso. I am all attention to what you say.

CHAPTER XIII.

THAT NOTHING IS LESS TOLERABLE IN THE ORDER OF THINGS, THAN THAT A CREATURE SHOULD ROB HIS CREATOR OF THE HONOUR DUE TO HIM, AND SHOULD NOT REPAY THAT OF WHICH HE ROBS HIM.

Anselm. Nothing is less tolerable in the order of things, than that a creature should rob his Creator of the honour due to Him, and not repay Him that of which he robs Him.

Boso. This is quite clear.

Anselm. But if nothing is less tolerable than a thing, nothing can be more unjustly tolerated.

Boso. This too is obvious.

Anselm. I suppose, then, you will not say that God ought to tolerate that, than which nothing can be more unjust to tolerate; viz., that a creature should not repay God that of which he robs Him.

Boso. I see this is undeniable.

Anselm. Also, if nothing be more great or good than God, nothing can be more just than that which preserves His honour in the disposing of events, even the Supreme Justice, which is nothing else than God Himself.

Boso. Nothing can be clearer than this too.

Anselm. There is nothing, then, that God would preserve with greater justice than the honour of His own dignity.

Boso. I must allow this to be true.

Anselm. Does it seem to you that He would preserve it intact, if He so allowed it to be taken from

Him, as that neither it should be restored, nor he who robs Him of it be punished?

Boso. I dare not say He would.

Anselm. It is necessary, then, either that the honour taken from Him should be repaid, or that punishment should follow; otherwise God would either not be just to Himself, or else would be impotent to exact either demand; which is horrible even to imagine.

Boso. I see that nothing can be said with greater reason.

CHAPTER XIV.

WHAT KIND OF HONOUR TO GOD IS THE PUNISHMENT OF THE SINNER.

Boso. But I would hear from you whether the punishment of the sinner *be* an honour to Him, or if so, what kind of honour. For if the punishment of the sinner be not an honour to Him, since the sinner does not pay what he had taken away, but is punished; God loses His honour so as not to regain it, which seems to contradict what has been said.

Anselm. That God should lose His own honour is impossible; for either the sinner of his own will pays what he owes, or God takes it from him against his will. For either man of his own free will exhibits that subjection to God which is due from him, whether by not sinning, or by making amends for his sin; or else God subjects him to Himself by tormenting him against his will, and by this means shews Himself to

be his Lord, which the same man refuses of his own will to acknowledge. In this it must be remarked, that like as man by sinning takes away what is God's, so God by punishing takes away what is man's. For not only is that said to be a man's own which he already possesses, but also that which is so far in his power as that he may have it. Therefore, since man was so formed that he might have had blessedness, if he had not sinned, when for his sin he is deprived of blessedness, and of all good, he pays out of his own property, although against his will, what he took away; because, although God does not transfer what He deprives him of to His own use and advantage,—as a man turns to his own use the money which he takes from another,—yet that which He deprives him of, He does use for His honour, by the very fact of depriving him of it. For by depriving him of it, He proves that the sinner, and all that he has, are subject to Himself.

CHAPTER XV.

WHETHER GOD MAY SUFFER HIS HONOUR TO BE VIOLATED EVEN A LITTLE.

Boso. I agree with what you say. But there is another question which I ask you to answer for me, viz., if God ought, as you prove, so to preserve His honour, why does He suffer it to be violated even a little? For in that it is suffered to be injured in any way, it is not kept intact or perfect.

Anselm. Nothing, as far as itself is concerned, can

be added to, or diminished from, the honour of God. For His honour is, like Himself, incorruptible, and in no way liable to change. But when any single creature preserves the order which is its own, and is as it were prescribed to it, whether by instinct or reason, it is said to obey God, and to pay Him honour; and this especially with a reasonable creature, to whom it is given to know what it owes to God. And this creature, when its will is to do what it ought, honours God; not that it confers any favour on Him, but that of its own accord it submits itself to His will and disposing; and preserves its own order in the universe, and, as far as in it lies, the beauty of the same universe. But when it does not will what it ought, it does, as far as it is concerned, dishonour to God, in that it does not submit itself of its own accord to His disposing; and disturbs, as far as it can, the order and beauty of the universe; although it can by no means injure or disfigure the power or dignity of God. For though those bodies which are contained in the circle of heaven were to will not to be under heaven, or to depart from the heavens, yet they could by no means be anywhere but under heaven; nor could they escape from heaven except by approaching heaven. For whencesoever they might come, or whithersoever they might go, or howsoever they might go, they would still be under heaven; so much the farther as they might depart from one quarter of the heavens, so much the nearer would they approximate to the opposite quarter. So, although man or an evil angel be unwilling to submit to the will and ordinance of God, yet he cannot escape from it; because if he will flee from the will of God commanding him,

he comes under the will of God punishing him. And if you ask how he passes from one to the other, it is only by the will of God permitting him; and this very thing, his willing or acting perversely, Supreme Wisdom converts to the order and beauty of the above-mentioned universe. For this spontaneous satisfaction for perversity, or the exaction of punishment from him who does not make satisfaction, (except that God in many ways brings good out of evil,) hold each their own in the same universe, and preserve the beauty of its order. Moreover, if the Divine Wisdom had not added this condition, when perversity strives to disturb the right order, there would have been, in the very universe which God ought to order, a certain deformity arising from the violated beauty of its order, and God would seem to have been wanting in His disposing of things. And since these two things are an inconsistency, so they are impossible; and hence it is necessary that every sin must be followed either by satisfaction or punishment.

Boso. You have satisfied my objection.

Anselm. It is evident, then, that no one can either honour or dishonour God, as He is in Himself; but as far as in him lies, any one seems to do so when he submits to, or withdraws his own will from, God's will.

Boso. I know not how I can contradict this.

Anselm. I will add yet something else.

Boso. Say on, till I am tired of listening.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE REASON WHY THE NUMBER OF ANGELS WHO FELL MUST BE RESTORED FROM MEN.

Anselm. It is agreed that God proposed, out of human nature which He made without sin, to restore the number of the angels who had fallen.

Boso. We believe this; but I would have some reason for this fact.

Anselm. You deceive me; for we proposed to treat only of the Incarnation of God, and you now bring in other questions for me to answer.

Boso. Be not angry, for God loveth a cheerful giver; and no one proves that he gives cheerfully what he promises, so completely as he who gives more than he promises: tell me therefore freely what I ask.

Anselm. We take it, then, as undoubtedly true that the rational nature, which either is or is to be blessed with the enjoyment of God, is foreknown by God to be of a certain rational and perfect number, so that it can neither be greater nor less. This is certain; for either God does not know in what number it would best be constituted, which is false, or if He knows, He constitutes it in that number which He knows to be most fit for this end. Wherefore either those angels who fell were made so as to be within this number, or because they exceeded it, were unable to persevere, and fell of necessity; which is an absurd thing to be imagined.

Boso. The truth of what you say is apparent.

Anselm. Since, then, they ought to have been of that number, either their number must of necessity be

restored, or the rational nature will remain in an imperfect number, though it was foreknown to exist in a perfect number, which cannot be.

Boso. Undoubtedly they must be restored.

Anselm. They must then be from human nature, for there is no other nature from which they can be restored.

CHAPTER XVII.

THAT OTHER ANGELS COULD NOT BE RESTORED IN THEIR PLACE.

Boso. Why could not either these very ones, or other angels, have been restored in their place?

Anselm. When you see the difficulty of our own restoration, you will understand the impossibility of their reconciliation. Again, other angels could not be restored in their place, for (not to speak of how this would seem to militate against the perfection of the first creation) it would not be right for them to be so, unless they could be such as these would have been, had they not sinned; for those would have persevered without having seen any vengeance taken for sin: and this, after their fall, would be impossible for others who were to be restored in their place. For those who know nothing of the punishment of sin, and they who behold continually its eternal punishment, cannot be equally worthy of praise for standing in the truth. Now it is not by any means to be supposed that the good angels were confirmed by the fall of the evil, but

by their own merit. For as the good, if they had sinned with the evil, would have been condemned together with them; so the unrighteous, had they remained steadfast with the just, would have been equally confirmed in grace. For if some of them were to be confirmed only by the fall of others, either none would ever be confirmed, or it would be necessary that one should fall, who should be punished for the sake of the confirmation of the others; both of which are absurd. Therefore they who stood were confirmed in that manner, in which all would have been confirmed had they stood; which manner I have shewn, as I was able, when I treated upon the reason why God did not give perseverance to the devil[q].

Boso. You have proved that the evil angels must be made up for out of human nature; and it is plain from this reasoning, that the elect of men are not in a smaller number than are the reprobate angels. But shew, if you can, whether they will be greater or not[r].

CHAPTER XIX.

THAT MAN CANNOT BE SAVED WITHOUT SATISFACTION OF SIN.

Anselm. It is agreed, then, that God purposed to make up out of men for the angels who had fallen.

Boso. Certainly.

[q] His treatise *De casu Diaboli.*

[r] Chapter XVIII., in which is shewn at great length, and with much ingenuity, the probability that the number of the elect of men is greater than that of the fallen angels, is omitted, as somewhat breaking the thread of the argument.

Anselm. These men, then, who are to be taken up into that heavenly city in the place of the angels, must be there in the same state as those angels would have been whose place they are to take, i.e., in the same as the good angels are now; otherwise, those who fell would not be restored: and it would follow, either that God could not perfect the good work which He began, or that He repented of having begun so great a good work: both of which are absurd.

Boso. True, it is necessary, then, that men should be equal to the good angels.

Anselm. Have the good angels ever sinned?

Boso. No.

Anselm. Can you conceive, then, that a man who has once sinned, and has never made satisfaction to God for his sin, but is only suffered to go unpunished, should be equal to an angel who has never sinned?

Boso. I might conceive and speak these words; but I cannot conceive of such a meaning for them; just as I cannot understand falsehood to be truth.

Anselm. It is not, then, consistent with God to take man, who is a sinner, without satisfaction, to make up for the lost angels; since truth does not suffer him to be raised to equality with the good angels.

Boso. So reason shews us.

Anselm. Consider, again, in the case of man alone, setting aside that he ought to be equal with the angels, whether it would be consistent for God to exalt him as he is to any blessedness, even such as he had before he sinned.

Boso. Say what you think; and I will consider it as well as I can.

Anselm. Let us suppose a rich man holds in his hand a precious pearl, which no pollution has ever touched, and which no one could move out of his hand unless he allowed it; he purposes to lay it up in his treasury, where are the most choice and precious things he has.

Boso. I conceive this as if it were before our eyes.

Anselm. What if he were to allow, though he might have prevented, some envious person to shake this same pearl out of his hand into the mire; and afterwards were to take it up out of the mire, all polluted and unwashed as it was, and were to lay it up in some clean and choice place of his, and were henceforth to keep it thus; would you think him in his senses?

Boso. How could I? For would it not have been much better for him to hold and keep his pearl clean, than polluted?

Anselm. Would not God be acting in a like manner, who kept man in paradise, as in His own hand, in the society of sinless angels; and permitted the devil, moved with envy, to cast him down, though with his own consent, into the mire of sin? For if He had willed to prevent the devil tempting him, he could not have tempted man. Would He not, I say, be acting like this rich man, if He were to restore man, stained with the filthiness of sin, without any cleansing, i.e., without any satisfaction, and he were to remain for ever even in the paradise from which he was expelled?

Boso. If God were to act thus, I dare not deny the similarity, and therefore I do not allow that He could act thus. For it would seem as though either He could not do what He had purposed to do, or else

that He repented of His good purpose; which cannot happen with God.

Anselm. Hold it, therefore, as a most certain truth, that without satisfaction, i.e., without a willing payment of the debt, God cannot let the sinner go unpunished; nor can the sinner attain to blessedness, even such as he had before he sinned; for were it so, man would not be restored even such as he was before his sin.

Boso. I cannot altogether contradict your reasoning. But how is it that we say to God, "Forgive us our debts;" and all people who believe in God, pray Him to forgive them their sins? Now if we pay what we owe, why do we pray Him to forgive us? Is God so unjust as to require over again what has been paid? But if we do not pay what we owe, why do we pray Him in vain to do what, (since it is inconsistent with His nature,) He cannot do?

Anselm. He who does not pay, in vain says "Forgive;" but he who does pay beseeches, for it is a very part of his payment to beseech; for God owes nothing to any one, but every creature owes to Him; and so it is not proper for man to deal with God as equal with equal. But on this point I need not answer you now. For when you see why Christ died, you will perhaps see what you want yourself.

Boso. What you have answered on this question is enough for me at present. But that no man can attain to blessedness with sin upon him, or can be freed from sin unless he pays that of which he has robbed [God] by sinning, you have so clearly demonstrated that, even if I would, I could not doubt.

CHAPTER XX.

THAT SATISFACTION MUST BE ACCORDING TO THE MEASURE OF THE SIN; AND THAT NO MAN CAN MAKE IT HIMSELF.

Anselm. You will not, I suppose, doubt this also, that it is necessary for satisfaction to be according to the measure of the sin.

Boso. Were it not so, sin would remain in some sort out of order; which cannot be, if God has left nothing out of order in His kingdom. And we have agreed that the smallest inconsistency in God is impossible.

Anselm. Tell me, then, what will you repay God for your sin?

Boso. I will give Him repentance, a contrite heart, humility, self-denial, and various works of the body; also mercy in giving and forgiving; and I will give Him obedience.

Anselm. What do you really *give* to God in all these things?

Boso. What! do not I honour God when, for fear and love of Him, in the sorrow of my heart I renounce temporal pleasures, and by my self-denial and earnest labours trample under foot the delights and ease of this life; when I am bountiful of my goods in giving away and forgiving what is owed to me; and when I subject myself in obedience to Him?

Anselm. When you render a thing which you owe to God, even if you have not sinned, you ought not to count this as the debt which you owe for your sin. Now all these things which you mention, you owe to

God [any way]. For such love as you mention you owe Him in this mortal life; and also to this belongs prayer, the desire of attaining the end for which you were made; sorrow, because you have not yet attained it; and fear, lest you should not attain to it; so that it is your duty not to feel any pleasure but in what gives you either help to attain or hope of attaining that end. For you do not deserve to have what you do not love and desire [with a fervour] in proportion to its value; and about which you do not grieve that you have not yet got it, and are as yet in such jeopardy whether you will have it or no. To the attaining of this also you must avoid ease, and the pleasures of the world, which call away the mind from that true repose and delight; except so far as you see they supply you with inducements to attain that happiness. Again, as to your bounty, you ought to consider that you do it as a debt, as you well know that what you give you have not from yourself, but from Him whose servant you are, and also he to whom you give; and nature teaches you to do to your fellow-servant (i.e., one man to another) what you would he should do to you; and that he who will not give what he has, has no right to receive what he has not. And then, as to forgiveness, I say in brief that vengeance by no means belongs to you, as we have said above: since neither are you your own, nor is he who has done the injury either yours or his own; but you are both servants of one Lord, and were created by Him out of nothing; and if you avenge yourself on your fellow-servant, you are proudly presuming upon that judgment which belongeth only to the Lord and Judge of all. Again, in

your obedience, what do you give to God which is not His due from you, to whose command you owe all that you are, and have, and are capable of?

Boso. I dare not now say that in these things I give God anything which I do not owe to Him [any way].

Anselm. What will you then repay God for your sin [against Him]?

Boso. If myself, and whatever I can do, even when I do not sin, I owe to Him on pain of sinning; I have nothing to repay Him with for my [past] sin.

Anselm. What will then become of you? how can you be saved?

Boso. If I consider your reasoning, I do not see how. But if I have recourse to my faith, by Christian faith which worketh by love I hope I may be saved; for it is written, "If the wicked will turn from all his sins that he hath committed, and do that which is lawful and right, all his transgressions shall be forgotten[s]."

Anselm. This is only said to those who either looked for Christ before He came, or believe in Him after He has come. But we supposed Christ and Christian faith as though they had never been; when we proposed to inquire by reason alone, whether His coming were necessary to the salvation of men.

Boso. So we did.

Anselm. By reason alone then let us proceed.

Boso. Well; though you lead me into some difficulties, yet I desire greatly that, as you have begun, you should go on.

[s] Ezekiel xviii. 21, 22.

CHAPTER XXI.

OF WHAT A GRIEVOUS WEIGHT IS SIN.

Anselm. Let us take for granted all those things which you supposed just now: that you are able to make payment for your sin, and that you owed no debt to God before; and let us see whether it can suffice for satisfaction for one sin so small as is a single look contrary to the will of God.

Boso. If I did not hear you put this in question, I should have thought this sin may be blotted out by one single prick of conscience.

Anselm. Have you not yet considered of what a grievous weight sin is?

Boso. Well, shew it me now.

Anselm. If you were to see yourself in the presence of God, and some one were to say to you "Look this way;" and God on the other hand were to say, "I will by no means have you look;" ask yourself in your own heart, what is there in all existing things, for the sake of which it would be right for you to give that look contrary to the will of God.

Boso. I do not find anything for the sake of which it would be right for me to do it; unless, perhaps, I were placed in such a necessity as that I must either do this or some greater sin.

Anselm. Take away this necessity, and consider the case of this sin alone; might you do it for your own redemption?

Boso. I see clearly that I might not.

Anselm. Well, not to tire you any longer,—what

if it were necessary, either that the whole world, and whatever is not God should perish, and be reduced to nothing, or that you should do so small an action contrary to the will of God?

Boso. When I considered the action itself, I see it to be a very trifling thing; but when I look what it is to do it contrary to the will of God, I perceive it to be a very grievous thing, and not to be put in comparison with any damage that might occur. But one sometimes acts contrary to the will of another without doing wrong, in order that his property may be preserved, and he is afterwards pleased that we acted contrary to his will.

Anselm. This is the case with man, who sometimes does not perceive what is profitable for him, or who cannot restore what he has lost: but God stands in need of no one, and He could, if they were to perish, restore all things just as He created them.

Boso. I must confess, then, that even for the preservation of the whole creation, I should have no right to act contrary to the will of God.

Anselm. What if there were more worlds full of creatures like this is?

Boso. If they were multiplied to an infinite number, and were put before me in like manner, I should make the same answer.

Anselm. You could do nothing better. But consider again: suppose it were to happen that you did give the look contrary to the will of God, what could you do to make amends for this sin?

Boso. I have nothing more than what I mentioned above.

Anselm. Well now; we sin thus grievously as often as we knowingly do anything, however small, contrary to the will of God; for we are always in His presence, and He always commands us not to commit sin.

Boso. As I understand you, we live in a very perilous state.

Anselm. It is clear that God requires satisfaction according to the amount of sin.

Boso. I cannot deny that.

Anselm. You do not therefore make satisfaction, if you do not repay something greater than that, for the sake of which you would have no right to commit the sin.

Boso. Yes, I see that reason so requires it, and also that it is quite impossible for me to do so.

Anselm. And God cannot receive into blessedness any one who is in any wise bound by the debt of sin.

Boso. This sentence is too heavy.

Anselm. Listen, again, to another reason for which it is equally difficult for man to be reconciled to God.

Boso. If faith were not to console me, this alone would drive me to despair.

Anselm. Yet listen.

Boso. Say on.

CHAPTER XXII.

WHAT AN AFFRONT MAN OFFERED TO GOD, WHEN HE ALLOWED HIMSELF TO BE LED CAPTIVE BY THE DEVIL; ONE ALSO FOR WHICH HE IS UNABLE TO MAKE SATISFACTION.

Anselm. Man in paradise, created without sin, was as it were put forward on God's behalf between God

and the devil, in order that he might overcome the devil by refusing to consent to his persuading him to sin, for the vindication and honour of God, and for the confusion of the devil; in that man of a weaker nature, and on earth, should not sin at the persuasion of the same devil, who of a stronger nature, and in heaven, did sin with no one to persuade him. And though man might easily have effected this [purpose of God], since he was not compelled to sin by any force, [still, in spite of all this,] at mere persuasion he allowed himself to be overcome by the wile of the devil, and [this] against the will and honour of God.

Boso. What are you aiming at?

Anselm. Judge for yourself, if it be not contrary to the honour of God that man should be reconciled to Him with the charge of this affront still upon him, unless he shall first have retrieved the honour of God by overcoming the devil, like as he dishonoured Him by being overcome by the devil. Moreover, the victory ought to be such, that, even as when strong and with the power of being immortal, he easily consented to the devil to sin, and thereby justly incurred the penalty of becoming mortal; so, weak and mortal as he had made himself, should he by the hard way of death overcome the devil, so as in no way to commit sin. And this he cannot do as long as from the wound of that original sin he is conceived and born in sin.

Boso. Again I say that reason also approves what you say, and it is impossible.

Anselm. Take yet one more condition without which man may not with justice be reconciled, and one no less impossible than the others.

Boso. You have already laid down so many things which we are bound to do, that whatever more you superadd, you cannot increase my terror.

Anselm. Listen, however.

Boso. I do.

CHAPTER XXIII.

WHAT MAN ROBBED GOD OF WHEN HE SINNED, WHICH HE IS UNABLE TO REPAY.

Anselm. What was that of which man robbed God when he allowed himself to be overcome by the devil?

Boso. Do you say, as you have begun, for I am at a loss to know what more he could add beyond those evils you have shewn [me].

Anselm. Did he not rob God of some end which He had purposed to effect out of human nature?

Boso. Undeniably he did.

Anselm. Regard it then in strict justice; and according to that, judge whether man would make satisfaction to God for his sin, if he did not, by overcoming the devil, restore to God that of which, by allowing himself to be overcome by the devil, he robbed Him; so that even as by his being overcome the devil plundered what was God's, and God lost it, in like manner by his overcoming the devil might lose, and God regain His own.

Boso. In strictness and justice nothing else can be thought of.

Anselm. And think you that Supreme Justice can violate this justice?

Boso. I dare not suppose so.

Anselm. Well, then, it follows that in no way has man the power or right of receiving from God what God purposed to give him, if he does not restore to God the whole of what he robbed Him of; so that as through him God lost, in like manner through him God should regain [what He had lost]. And this cannot be otherwise accomplished than that, as by being overcome the whole of human nature was corrupted, and, as it were, leavened by sin, (and with sin God exalts no one to the perfection of that heavenly city,) so by overcoming so many men might be justified from sin, as were to fill up that number to complete which man was created. But to do this is not in any way possible for a man who is a sinner, since one sinner cannot justify another sinner.

Boso. Nothing is more just, and nothing more impossible. But by all these things the mercy of God and the hope of man seem to be at an end as far as regards the blessedness for which man was made.

Anselm. Wait a little yet.

Boso. What more have you?

CHAPTER XXIV.

THAT SO LONG AS MAN DOES NOT REPAY TO GOD WHAT HE OWES, HE CANNOT BE BEATIFIED; AND THAT HE IS NOT EXCUSED BY HIS INABILITY.

Anselm. If a man is called unjust who does not repay another man what he owes, much more is he unjust who does not repay God what he owes.

Boso. If he can, and does not repay, he is truly unjust. But if he is unable, how is he unjust?

Anselm. Perhaps, if there is no cause in him for his inability, he might to some extent be excused. But if in that very inability there is guilt, then, as it does not lighten the sin, so neither does it excuse his not repaying his debt. For instance, if a man orders his servant to do some work, and warns him against letting himself fall into a pit which he shews him, from which it would be impossible for him to get out; and yet that servant, despising his lord's command and warning, of his own accord lets himself fall into the pit which had been shewn him beforehand, so that he is altogether unable to do the work ordered him, do you think that this inability would in any way suffice for an excuse for his not doing the work ordered him?

Boso. By no means, but rather would it be an aggravation of his guilt, because he created that inability for himself. In fact, he sinned doubly; in that what he was commanded to do, he did not; and also what he was enjoined not to do, he did.

Anselm. So man, who of his own accord rendered himself liable to that debt, which he cannot pay, and by his own fault let himself fall into this inability, so that he can neither pay what was due [from him to God] before his sin, viz., to abstain from sinning, nor this which is due from him because he has sinned,—he is thus without excuse. Moreover, his very inability is a fault, in that he had no business to have it; nay, his business was not to have it: for as it is a fault not to have what one ought, so is it also a fault to have what one ought not. Therefore, as it is man's own

fault that he has not that power which he received in order that he might avoid sin, so is it also his fault that he has that inability, in consequence of which he can neither preserve righteousness and avoid sin, nor repay what he owes for the sin [he has committed].

Besides, of his own accord he did that by which he lost that power, and fell into this [state of] inability. For it is the same thing not to have that power which one ought to have, and to have that inability which one ought not to have. Wherefore, the inability to repay God what he owes, which inability makes him not repay it, does not excuse man for not repaying it, since the result of sin does not excuse the sin which produces that result.

Boso. It is a very grievous thing, and yet it must be so.

Anselm. The man, therefore, is unjust who does not repay God what he owes.

Boso. It is too true; for he is unjust in not paying, and he is unjust in not being able to pay.

Anselm. But no unjust man will be admitted to blessedness; since as that blessedness is complete in which there is no want, so it is fit for none but him in whom righteousness is so pure that there is no unrighteousness in him.

Boso. I dare not believe otherwise.

Anselm. He, therefore, who does not pay God what he owes, cannot be beatified.

Boso. No: I must admit this consequence.

Anselm. But if you insist upon saying that a merciful God forgives the suppliant what he owes on the account that he is unable to pay the debt, He can

only be said to forgive him either that which man ought to pay of his own accord, and cannot, (i.e. what may make amends for the sin which ought not to have been committed, even for the preservation of every thing that is not God [t],) or else that which by punishing him He was about to take from him against his will, i.e. as I said before, blessedness [which he would otherwise have enjoyed]. Now, if it be true that God does forgive what man ought to pay of his own accord, just because he cannot do so, what else is it than that God remits what He cannot get? And it is a mockery to attribute such a kind of mercy to God. But, on the other hand, if God remits what He was about to exact from man against his will on account of his inability to pay what he ought to pay of his own accord, then God relaxes the punishment due to sin, and makes man blessed on account of his sin, viz., because he has what he ought not to have: for that very inability he ought not to have, and, consequently, as long as he has it without making satisfaction for it, it is sin to him; but divine mercy of such a kind as this is exceedingly contrary to His justice, which allows of nothing but a penalty to be paid for sin. Wherefore, as it is impossible for God to be contrary to Himself, so is it impossible for Him to be merciful after such a manner as this.

Boso. I see that another kind of mercy than this must be looked for in God.

Anselm. Let it be true that God forgives him who does not pay on the account that he cannot pay.

Boso. So I wished to have it.

[t] See chap. xxi. p. 47.

Anselm. But so long as he does not pay, he either wishes to pay, or does not wish: and if he cannot do what he wishes, he would be needy; but if he do not wish, he would be unjust.

Boso. This is very evident.

Anselm. Still, whether he be needy or unjust, [in neither case] will he be blessed.

Boso. This, too, is clear.

Anselm. So long then as he does not pay, he will be incapable of being blessed.

Boso. If God follows reason in His justice, there is no way by which a miserable wretch of a man may escape, and the mercy of God seems to be at an end.

Anselm. You have asked for reasoning, now abide by reasoning. I do not deny God to be merciful, *who saveth both man and beast, as He hath multiplied His mercies;* but we are speaking of that last act of mercy by which after this life He makes man blessed. Now that this blessedness ought not to be given to any but to him whose sins are entirely remitted, and that this remission ought not to be granted except when the debt which is owing for sin, and which is in proportion to the greatness of the sin, is paid,—[all this] I think I have, by the arguments stated above, proved with sufficient clearness. If you think any objection can be made to these arguments, you ought to say so.

Boso. Indeed, I do not see how the weight of any one of your arguments can in any degree be weakened.

Anselm. Nor do I think they can, if they be well considered. But yet, if even one of all the arguments I have brought forward be established by infallible truth, it ought to be enough [to prove our point]. For if a truth be infallibly demonstrated, whether by one

argument or many, it is equally secured against all doubt.

Boso. I see; so it is. How then is man to be saved, if he does not pay what he owes, and yet cannot be saved if he does not pay? Or with what face can we assert that God, who is rich in mercy beyond man's understanding, cannot do this act of mercy?

Anselm. You ought to ask this of those (who do not believe that Christ is necessary to the salvation of man) in whose place you are speaking, that they may tell you how man can be saved without Christ. But if they cannot do so in any way, then let them cease scoffing at us, and let them come and join themselves to us, who do not doubt that man can be saved through Christ, or else let them despair of its being possible for it to be done in any way at all. If they shrink from this, let them with us believe in Christ, that they may be saved.

Boso. I would ask of you, as I did at first, to shew me in what way man may be saved through Christ.

CHAPTER XXV.

THAT OF NECESSITY MAN MAY BE SAVED BY CHRIST.

Anselm. Is it not sufficiently proved that man may be saved by Christ, when even unbelievers do not deny that man may in some way be made blessed, and it has been made sufficiently clear that, if we suppose Christ not to have been, in no way can the salvation of man be found? For man must either be saved by Christ, or some one else, or else in no way at all: wherefore, if it be untrue that this cannot be done in any way, or

that it can by any other means, it must of necessity be done by Christ.

Boso. If a man sees the reason why it cannot be in any other way, and does not understand the reason why it must be by Christ, but persists in asserting that it can be done neither by Christ nor in any other way, what answer shall we give him?

Anselm. What answer must we give to the man who settles a thing, which must of necessity be, to be impossible, on the account that he does not know how it is?

Boso. That he had lost his senses.

Anselm. Therefore no account is to be taken of what he says.

Boso. True; but we must shew him this very thing, how that is which he thinks impossible.

Anselm. Do you not perceive, from what we said above, that there must of necessity be some men to attain to blessedness? Now if it be inconsistent for God to bring man with any sin upon him to that state for which He created him without any spot at all, lest He should seem either to have repented of the good work He had begun, or not to have been able to accomplish His purpose, much more is it, on account of the same inconsistency, impossible that no man at all should be brought to that state for which he was created. Wherefore, we must either find, apart from the Christian faith, a satisfaction for sin, such as we have shewn above ought to be made,—and this no reasoning can discover,—or we must undoubtingly believe that it is [to be found] in that faith. For that, which by a chain of reasoning is shewn to be necessarily

true, ought not to be submitted to any doubting, even though the reason, how it is so, be not perceived.

Boso. What you say is true.

Anselm. What more then do you require?

Boso. I did not come to you for the purpose of your removing for me doubts about the faith, but for you to shew me the reason of my certainty. Wherefore, as you have by strict reasoning brought [the question] down so far, as that I see that sinful man owes that to God for His sin which he is unable to pay, and without his having paid it he cannot be saved; in the same way I now wish you to lead me on further, so that by a necessary chain of reasoning I may understand how all those things must of necessity be true which the Catholic faith enjoins us to believe concerning Christ, if we would be saved; also in what way they avail for the salvation of men, and how God in His mercy can save man, though He does forgive him his sin, without his having paid the debt he has incurred by it. And that your arguments may be the more sure, do you so start from first principles as to establish them on a firm foundation.

Aneslm. May God help me then, for you have no manner of mercy upon me, and do not consider the shallowness of my knowledge when you impose so great a work upon me. However, I will make the attempt, even as I began at first, with confidence, not in myself, but in God, and I will do what with His help I can. But for fear I should weary any one who may wish to read this by too long a continuation of the subject, we will distinguish what follows from what has been already said by a new commencement.

BOOK II.

CHAPTER I.

THAT MAN WAS CREATED BY GOD RIGHTEOUS, THAT HE MIGHT BE BLESSED WITH THE ENJOYMENT OF GOD.

Anselm. THAT the rational nature was created by God righteous, that by enjoying Him it might be blessed, ought not to be questioned. For on this account is it rational, that it may discern between righteous and unrighteous, between good and evil, between greater good and less good; otherwise it would have been made rational in vain. But God did not make it rational in vain. Therefore there is no doubt but that it was made rational for the end just mentioned.

Similarly it follows that it also received the power of discernment, to the end that it might hate and avoid evil, and love and choose good, and still more love and choose greater good. For otherwise God would have given it the power of discernment in vain; for it would discern in vain, unless it loved and avoided things according to its discernment. But it is not consistent with God to have given such a power in vain. Therefore it is certain that the rational creation was created for this end, that it should above all things love and choose the Highest Good, not for anything else, but for

Himself; for if it loves Him for anything else, it loves that and not Him.

Now this it cannot do unless it is itself righteous. Consequently, that it might not be rational in vain, it was created accordingly at once rational and righteous.

Again, if it was created righteous that it might choose and love the Highest Good, either it was made such to the end that it should at length obtain what it loves and chooses, or not. But if it was not created righteous to the end that it might obtain what it so loves and chooses, it was created such as so to love and choose it in vain, and there will be no reason why that object should ever be attained. As long, therefore, as by loving and choosing the Highest Good, it does what is right and that for which it was created, it will be miserable, because it will be in want against its will, from not having what it longs for; which is sufficiently absurd. Wherefore the rational creation was made righteous, that it might be blessed with the enjoyment of the Highest Good, that is, God: and hence man, who is a rational creature, was created righteous, to the end that he might be blessed with the enjoyment of God.

CHAPTER II.

THAT MAN WOULD NOT HAVE DIED IF HE HAD NOT SINNED.

Anselm. Again, that he was created such as that he would not of necessity have died, is easily proved thus:—because, as we just now said, it is inconsistent with the wisdom and justice of God that He should

compel man to suffer death without any fault of his, whom He created righteous for eternal blessedness. It follows, therefore, that if he had never sinned he would never have died.

CHAPTER III.

THAT, WITH THE BODY IN WHICH HE LIVES IN THIS LIFE, MAN WILL RISE AGAIN.

Anselm. Hence it evidently follows that there will be a resurrection of the dead. For if man is to be perfectly restored, he ought to be restored such as he would have been if he had not sinned.

Boso. It cannot be otherwise.

Anselm. In like manner, therefore, as man, if he had not sinned, would have been transformed into incorruption with the same body which he then bore, so is it right that, when he is to be restored, he should be restored with his own body in which he lived in this life.

Boso. What shall we answer, if any one says that this ought indeed to be the case with those in whom the human race is to be restored, but that it is not necessary for it to be so with the reprobate?

Anselm. Nothing can be conceived more righteous or more fitting than that, as man would altogether, i.e. body and soul, had he persevered in righteousness, been blessed for ever, so he shall, if he have persevered in unrighteousness, be in like manner altogether miserable for ever.

Boso. You have soon satisfied me of this.

CHAPTER IV.

THAT OUT OF HUMAN NATURE GOD IS TO PERFECT WHAT HE BEGAN.

Anselm. From these things it is easy to see that either God is to perfect what He began out of the human race, or that He created so sublime a nature for so great a good in vain. Now if it be acknowledged that God made nothing of more value than the rational nature to rejoice in Him, far is it from Him to suffer any rational nature to perish entirely.

Boso. No rational mind can think otherwise.

Anselm. It is necessary, therefore, that He should of human nature perfect what He began; but this cannot, as we have said, be done except by a full satisfaction for sin, which no sinner can make.

Boso. I understand now that it is necessary for God to perfect what He began, lest, contrary to what is fitting, He should seem to fail in His own undertaking.

CHAPTER V.

THAT, ALTHOUGH THIS BE NECESSARY TO BE DONE, YET THAT HE DOES NOT DO IT BY THE FORCE OF NECESSITY; ALSO WHAT THAT NECESSITY IS WHICH TAKES AWAY OR DIMINISHES OBLIGATION, AND WHAT THAT WHICH INCREASES IT.

Boso. But if it be so, it appears as though God were forced, by the necessity of avoiding what was unbefitting Him, to procure the salvation of man. How could it, therefore, be denied that He does this more for His own sake than for ours? Now if it be so, what obligation do we owe Him for that which He did for

His own sake? Nay more, how shall we even impute our salvation to His grace, if He saves us from necessity?

Anselm. There is one kind of necessity, which takes away or lessens the obligation to a benefactor; and there is another, by which a greater obligation for the benefit is due. For when a man bestows a benefit, by a necessity he is under, against his will, either no obligation is due to him at all, or a less obligation. But when he himself of his own accord puts himself under the necessity of bestowing the benefit, and willingly submits to that necessity, then surely he deserves more gratitude for the benefit. Since this should not be called necessity, but goodwill; because he submits to or obeys it under no one's compulsion, but of his own free will.

For if what you promise of your own accord to-day that you will give tomorrow, you do give tomorrow with the same willingness, although it be necessary for you tomorrow to fulfil your promise, or tell a falsehood, still he to whom you give does not owe you less gratitude for the benefit bestowed, than he would if you had never promised at all, for you were not forced to have made yourself a debtor before the time of giving to him.

Such is the case when a man of his own accord vows a resolution of a religious life[u]. For although after the vow he is bound by necessity to keep it, on pain of incurring the condemnation of apostacy, and although he may be forced to keep it if he demurs,

[u] St. Anselm is alluding to Counsels of Perfection commended by our Lord (Matt. xix. 11, 12), and St. Paul (1 Cor. vii. 7, 32, 37.)

still however, if he willingly keeps what he vows, he is not less, but rather more pleasing to God, than if he had never made the vow; since not only has he renounced for God's sake an ordinary life, but the liberty he had of leading such a life; and he must be said to live a religious life, not of necessity, but with the same willingness with which he made the vow.

Much more, therefore, if God accomplishes the good which He began to do to man, (although it may not befit Him to leave off a good work He began to do,) ought we to impute the whole of it to His grace; since for our sakes, not for His, for He is in lack of nothing, He began this work. For He was not ignorant of what man would become when He made him; and yet with that same goodness of His which created him, He voluntarily bound Himself, as it were, to bring to perfection that good work which He had begun. In fact, God does nothing of necessity; because He is in no way forced to do, or hindered from doing, anything. And when we say that God does a thing as it were from the necessity of avoiding dishonour, which, however, He has no fear of, we ought rather to be understood to say that He does it from the necessity of maintaining His honour; and even this necessity is nothing else but the unchangeableness of His honour, which He has from Himself, and not from another; and therefore it is not, properly speaking, necessity. Still, we may say that it is necessary for the goodness of God, on account of its own unchangeableness, to bring to perfection in man what it had begun, although the good which it does be all free grace.

Boso. Granted.

CHAPTER VI.

THAT THE SATISFACTION, THROUGH WHICH MAN MAY BE SAVED, COULD NOT BE MADE EXCEPT BY GOD-MAN.

Anselm. Now this [good thing, i.e. the perfection of the human race,] cannot be done, unless there be some one to give to God in amends for the sin of man something of more value than all that exists besides God.

Boso. So we agreed.

Anselm. Again, he who could out of what is his own give to God something greater than all below God, must needs be greater than all that is not God.

Boso. I cannot deny that.

Anselm. Now there is nothing above all that is not God except God Himself.

Boso. True.

Anselm. No one therefore *can* make this satisfaction except God Himself.

Boso. So it follows.

Anselm. But yet no one *ought* to make it except man; otherwise man does not make satisfaction.

Boso. Nothing seems more just.

Anselm. If, therefore, as was agreed, it is necessary that out of man should be perfected that heavenly kingdom, and this cannot be unless the above-mentioned satisfaction has been made, which no one *can* make except God, and no one *ought* to make except man, it is necessary that God-man should make it.

Boso. Blessed be God! now, indeed, we have made a grand discovery in what we are seeking. Go on,

therefore, as you have begun; for I trust God will help us.

Anselm. We must now inquire how it is possible for God to be made man.

CHAPTER VII.

THAT IT IS NECESSARY THAT THE SAME PERSON BE PERFECT GOD AND PERFECT MAN.

Anselm. The divine and human natures cannot be changed into each other, as that the divine should become human, or the human divine; nor can they be so mingled as that of the two there should be some third nature, neither wholly divine nor wholly human. In fact, if it were possible for one to be converted into the other, there would necessarily be either God alone and no man, or man alone and no God. Or if they were so mingled as that of the two natures mixed there should be a third, (as of two animals, each of different species, male and female, is born a third, which keeps neither the nature of its father entire nor yet of its mother, but has a third nature of both mixed,) it would be neither man nor God. Hence the man-God whom we seek of the divine and human nature, cannot be formed either from the conversion of one into the other, or from the confused commixture of both into a third; for neither of these are possible; and if they were, they would avail nothing for what we are in search of. But if in any way these two entire natures are said to be so united as that, although one be man

and the other God, yet the same be not God who is also man, it is impossible for both to do what is necessary to be done. For God will not do it, because He *ought* not; and man will not, because he *cannot:* therefore, that the God-man may do it, it is necessary that the self-same Person who is to make this satisfaction be perfect God and perfect man, since He cannot make it unless He be really God, and He ought not to make it unless He be really man. Since, therefore, it is necessary to find a God-man with the integrity of each nature preserved, it is no less necessary that these two entire natures should meet in one Person, like as the body and the rational soul meet in one man; since otherwise it cannot come to pass that the self-same Person be perfect God and perfect man.

Boso. I approve of all you say.

CHAPTER VIII.

THAT OF THE RACE OF ADAM AND OF A VIRGIN MOTHER, IT BEHOVED GOD TO TAKE UPON HIM HUMANITY.

Anselm. It remains now to inquire whence and how God may take upon Him human nature. For either He may take it from Adam, or He may form a new man, as He formed Adam, from no other human being. But if He forms a new man not of Adam's race, he will not belong to the human race which is born of Adam; and, consequently, will not make satisfaction for it, because he will not be of it. For as it is right that for the fault of man, man should make satisfaction, so is it necessary that he who makes satis-

faction should be the same person or of the same race as he who is the sinner; since otherwise neither Adam nor his race would make satisfaction for him. Therefore, as from Adam and Eve sin has been propagated through all men, so no one, but they themselves or one who is born from them, ought to make satisfaction for the sin of men. Consequently, since they cannot do it, he who does it must needs be born of them.

Further: as Adam, and through him his whole race, would have stood fast, without the sustaining arm of any other creature, if he had not sinned, so is it fitting that if the same race rise again after its fall, it should rise again and stand of itself. For by whomsoever it be replaced in its former state, by him surely it will stand, by whom it shall recover its former state.

Again: when God created human nature, He formed it originally in Adam alone; and was pleased to form even woman (that from both sexes men should be multiplied) in no way but out of him; He clearly shewed that it was not His will to form what He was about to form of human nature, except out of Adam. Wherefore, if the race of Adam be lifted up again by any man who is not of his race, it will not be restored to that dignity which it would have had if Adam had not sinned, and so will not be entirely restored, and the purpose of God will seem to have failed; which two things are inconsistent with God: therefore, it is necessary that the Man by whom the race of Adam is to be restored should be taken out of Adam.

Boso. If we follow reason as we proposed, this must inevitably be the case.

Anselm. Let us inquire now whether the nature of man to be assumed by God must be derived from father and from mother, as other men are, or from man without woman, or from woman without man. For in whichever of these three ways it be, it will be from Adam and from Eve, from whom is every human being of either sex; and no one of these three is more easy for God than the others, that it should rather be assumed in that way.

Boso. Well, go on.

Anselm. But there is no need of much labour to shew that that Man will be more purely and honourably brought forth of a man alone or a woman, than by the connexion of both, as all the other sons of men are.

Boso. That is sufficient reason.

Anselm. The nature to be assumed, then, is to be taken either from man alone, or from woman alone.

Boso. It can be from no other source.

Anselm. In four ways God may form man: viz., either from man and from woman, as ordinary custom shews us; or, neither from man nor from woman, as He created Adam; or thirdly, from man without woman, as He formed Eve; or lastly, from woman without man, which He has not yet done. That, therefore, He may prove this way also to be within His power, nay, delayed for this very end, nothing is more consistent than that He should take from woman without man that Man of whom we are inquiring.

Now whether it be more worthy of God that this should be from a virgin, or from one not a virgin, there is no occasion to dispute; but beyond all doubt we must

assert that it is fitting that the God-man should be born of a virgin.

Boso. You speak what is well pleasing to my heart.

Anselm. Is what we have said solid, or is it something vain like a cloud, which you said unbelievers charged us with?

Boso. Nothing is more solid.

Anselm. Picture, then, not upon a fictitious vanity, but upon a solid truth, and say how very right and proper it is that, as man's sin and the cause of our damnation took its beginning from woman, so the Remedy for sin and the Cause of our salvation should be born of a woman: and, lest woman should despair of belonging to the lot of the blessed, since from a woman had proceeded so much evil, it is right that, for the re-establishing of their hopes, of a woman should proceed so great a good.

Picture also this: if it was a virgin who was the cause of all the evil to the human race, much more is it right that she should be a virgin who is to be the cause of all the good.

This picture too: if the woman whom God made of a man without woman was made of a virgin, it is most consistent that the Man also who is to be made of a woman without man should be made of a virgin. But of the pictures which may be painted upon this [ground], that the God-man ought to be born of a virgin-woman, these will now suffice.

Boso. These pictures of yours are very beautiful, and very reasonable.

CHAPTER IX.

THAT IT IS NECESSARY THAT THE WORD ALONE AND MAN SHOULD MEET IN ONE PERSON.

Anselm. We must now inquire further in which Person God, who is three Persons, may assume manhood. For a plurality of Persons cannot take one and the same man into unity of Person. Consequently, this must be done in one Person only. But of this unity of Person of God and man, and by which Person of the Godhead this should rather be done, I have spoken as much as I think will suffice for the present inquiry in my Epistle 'On the Incarnation of the Word,' addressed to the Lord Pope Urban [x].

Boso. Still here I would ask you to trace briefly the reason why the Person of the Son should be made flesh rather than that of the Father or of the Holy Ghost.

Anselm. If any other Person is to be incarnate, there will be two Sons in the Trinity [y]; the Son, that is of God, who is the Son even before the incarnation; and He who by incarnation will be the Son of the Virgin; and there will be in the Persons, who should be always equal, an inequality corresponding to the dignity of their nativity; for He who is born of God will have a higher nativity than He who is born of the

[x] His book, *De fide Trinitatis, et de incarnatione Verbi, contra blasphemias Roscelini.*

[y] The Editor has ventured to omit a sentence in which the argument here has been carried still further, as calculated to provoke a smile. The reasoning in this passage is, however, followed in Beveridge's "Private Thoughts," where the same subject is discussed.

Virgin: all which are inconsistencies, and do not follow from the incarnation of the Word.

There is also another reason why it is more consistent for the Son to be incarnate than for the other Persons, because it sounds more consistent for the Son to pray to the Father, than for any other Person to pray to another.

Again, man for whom He was to pray, and the devil whom He was to overcome, have both, of their own wills, presumptuously assumed a false likeness to God. By this they sinned, as it were, specially against the Person of the Son, who is acknowledged to be the true likeness of the Father. To Him, therefore, to whom the injury has specially been done, belongs most consistently the power of avenging or of pardoning the fault. Wherefore, since inevitable reasoning has led us to this, that it is necessary that the divine and human nature should meet in one Person, and this cannot be in a plurality of the Persons in the Godhead, and appears more consistently to be done in the Person of the Son than in that of the others, it is necessary that the Word of God and man should meet in one Person.

Boso. The way by which you lead me is so fortified on every side by reason, that I see I cannot turn from it either to the right hand or to the left.

Anselm. It is not I that lead you, but He of whom we are speaking, without whom we can do nothing; He leads so long as we hold to the way of truth.

CHAPTER X.

THAT THIS MAN WOULD NOT DIE FROM ANY DEBT [HE OWED TO NATURE]; AND HOW HE HAD THE POWER AND YET HAD NOT THE POWER OF SINNING; AND WHY HE OR AN ANGEL ARE TO BE PRAISED FOR THEIR RIGHTEOUSNESS, ALTHOUGH THEY CANNOT SIN.

Anselm. Now whether that Man is to die from the debt [of nature], as all other men die from what they owe, we should not stop to inquire; for if Adam was not to have died if he had not sinned, much more will not this Man be under obligation to suffer death, in whom there cannot possibly be any sin, because He is God.

Boso. Here I want you to stop a little; for whether He be said to have the power of sinning, or not to have the power of sinning, either way there springs up before me no small difficulty. For if He be said not to have the power of sinning, it seems a thing one should be slow to believe; for not to speak for the present of Him who has never yet been, as we have but just done, but as of Him whom we know, and His deeds too, who can deny but that He could have done many things which we call sins? For instance, not to speak of other things, how can we say that He could not have told a falsehood, which is always a sin; for when He speaks to the Jews of the Father, "If I should say, 'I know Him not,' I shall be a liar like unto you," and among these words He says, "I know Him not," who can say that He had not the power of bringing forth these same four words, or in other words, to have

said "I know Him not?" And if He had done this, as He Himself says, He would have been a liar, that is, a sinner. Wherefore, since He had the power of doing this, He had the power of sinning.

Anselm. He both had the power of saying this, and yet He could not have sinned.

Boso. Shew me how.

Anselm. All power follows the will; for when I say I have the power of speaking or walking, there is understood "if I will;" for if the will is not understood, it is not power, but necessity. Now when I say that I may be dragged captive or conquered against my will, this is not my power, but necessity and the power of another. For this "I have the power of being dragged captive or conquered," is nothing else than that another has the power of dragging me captive or conquering me. We may, therefore, say of Christ, that He could have told a falsehood, if there be understood "if He wished;" and since He could not against His will have told a falsehood, neither could He have wished to do so, it may no less be said that He could not have told a falsehood. Thus, therefore, He could and yet could not have spoken falsehood.

Boso. Now let us return to the inquiry concerning that Man as though He were not yet in being, as we began. I say, then, that if He will not be able to sin, because, as you say, He cannot wish to sin, He will preserve His righteousness of necessity; wherefore He will not be righteous from freeness of will. What praise, then, will be due to Him for His righteousness? For we are wont to say that God made angel and man so as to have the power of sinning on the

account that, although they might have forsaken their righteousness, yet as long as with freeness of will they kept it, they would deserve thanks and praise, which would not have been their due had they been righteous of necessity.

Anselm. Are not the angels to be praised, who now cannot sin?

Boso. They are indeed; because this, which now they cannot do, they merited by that which once they could have done and yet would not.

Anselm. What do you say of God, who cannot sin; (and yet He did not merit this by having had the power of sinning and not sinning;) is not He to be praised for His righteousness?

Boso. Here I wish you would answer for me; for if I say that He is not to be praised, I know I shall speak falsely; but if I say He is, I am afraid of weakening the case of the angels which I mentioned.

Anselm. The angels are not to be praised for their own righteousness because they once had the power of sinning, but because of this, that they have it in some way from themselves that they cannot sin; and in this they are something like God, who has whatever He possesses from Himself. For he is said to give a thing, who does not take it away when he can; and he is said to cause a thing to be, who, when he could cause it not to be, does not do so. So, therefore, when the angel had the power of depriving himself of righteousness, and did not so deprive himself, and had the power of causing himself not to be righteous, and did not so cause himself, he is rightly asserted to have given himself his own righteousness, and to have made

himself righteous. In this way, therefore, has he his righteousness from himself, (for a creature can in no other way have it from himself,) and on that account is he to be praised for his righteousness; and he is righteous, not from necessity, but from free will, since that is improperly termed necessity in which there is neither compulsion nor prohibition. Wherefore, since God has perfectly from Himself whatever He possesses, He is especially to be praised for the good things which He has and holds from no necessity at all, but, as I said before, of His own proper and eternal unchangeableness.

So, therefore, will that Man, who is to be the same God Himself,—since every good thing which He will have He will have from Himself,—therefore will He be, not of necessity, but of free will, righteous both of and from Himself, and therefore worthy to be praised. For although His human nature will have what it may possess from the divine, yet He, the self-same, (since two natures are to be in one Person,) will have it from Himself.

Boso. You have satisfied me on this point, and I see clearly both that He will not be able to sin, and yet be worthy of praise for His righteousness. But now I think we must inquire, Since God could form such a Man, why did He not form the angels and the two first human beings such that they likewise might not have been able to sin, and might have been worthy to be praised for their righteousness?

Anselm. Do you understand what you say?

Boso. I seem to myself to understand, and therefore I inquire why He did not form them so?

Anselm. Because it was neither possible nor fitting that each one of them should be the very same as God, like the Man of whom we are speaking; and if you ask, why did He not form so many as there are Persons in the Godhead, or, at least, one such as this? I answer, that reason then by no means required this, but altogether (for God does nothing without reason) forbad it.

Boso. I am ashamed of having asked this: but tell me what you were going to say.

Anselm. Let us say, then, that He will be under no necessity of dying, since He will not be a sinner.

Boso. This I must admit.

CHAPTER XI.

THAT HE IS TO DIE BY HIS OWN POWER, AND THAT MORTALITY IS NOT A PROPERTY OF PURE HUMAN NATURE.

Anselm. But now it remains for us to investigate whether it be possible for Him to die according to His human nature, for according to His divine nature He will be ever incorruptible.

Boso. Why should we doubt this, since He is to be really very Man, and every man is mortal by nature?

Anselm. I do not think that mortality belongs to the pure, but rather to the corrupt, nature of man. For if man had never sinned, and his immortality had been unchangeably established, he would no less have been really man; and when mortals shall rise again in incorruption, they will be no less really men: for if

mortality were a part of the reality of human nature, there would be no possibility for a man to be immortal. Corruptibility does not, therefore, belong to the reality of human nature, nor does incorruptibility; since neither one nor the other makes or destroys the man, but one has power to make him miserable, and the other to make him happy. But since there is no man who has not to die, therefore "mortal" is placed among the definitions of "man" by philosophers, who did not believe that the whole human being ever could have been or can be immortal. Hence the fact that He is to be really man is not sufficient to prove that the Man we are speaking of ought to be mortal.

Boso. Find out, then, another reason; for if you are ignorant how to prove it possible for Him to die, I am sure I am.

Anselm. There is no doubt but that as He is to be God, so He is to be omnipotent.

Boso. True.

Anselm. If, then, He wish to do it, He will have power to lay down His life, and power to take it again.

Boso. If He has not this power, He would not seem to be omnipotent.

Anselm. He will have the power then, if He will, of never dying, and He will also have the power of dying and rising again. Now whether He lays down His life without any man making Him do it, or whether another man makes Him do it and He allows him, makes no difference as far as His power is concerned.

Boso. Undoubtedly.

Anselm. If, then, He shall so will as to allow it, He

may be put to death; and if He be not willing, He cannot be.

Boso. To this reason infallibly brings us.

Anselm. Reason also has taught us that it is necessary for Him to have something greater than all things short of God, which He may willingly and not of debt give to God.

Boso. Such is the case.

Anselm. But this cannot be found either beneath Him or outside of Him.

Boso. True.

Anselm. It must be found then in Himself.

Boso. So it follows.

Anselm. He is to give, then, either Himself, or something out of Himself.

Boso. I can comprehend no other way.

Anselm. We must inquire now of what kind this gift ought to be. For He will not be able to give Himself, or anything out of Himself, to God, as though God did not already possess it as His own, since every creature is God's.

Boso. So it is.

Anselm. This gift, then, must be understood thus: that He shall in some way devote to the honour of God either Himself, or something coming from Himself, in a way in which He is not in debt bound to do.

Boso. So it follows from what we have said above.

Anselm. If we say that He shall give Himself to obey God, so as, by perseveringly keeping His righteousness, to submit Himself to His will, to give this would not be to give what God did not require from

Him as a debt; for every rational creature owes this obedience to God.

Boso. This cannot be denied.

Anselm. He must, therefore, give Himself or something out of Himself to God in some other way.

Boso. Reason drives us to this conclusion.

Anselm. Let us see if peradventure this be to give His life, or to lay down His life, or to deliver Himself to death for the honour of God. Now this as a debt God would not require of Him; for since there is to be no sin in Him, He will be under no obligation of dying, as we said before.

Boso. I cannot conceive it otherwise.

Anselm. Let us consider further whether it be consistent with reason in this way.

Boso. Do you speak, and I will willingly listen.

Anselm. If man sinned by pleasure, is it not consistent that he should make satisfaction by pain? And if he were so overcome by the devil as to dishonour God by sinning with such ease as that he could not have been more easily overcome, is it not just that man, in making satisfaction to God for sin, should overcome the devil with such great difficulty, as that greater there could not be? Is it not meet, that whereas he so stole himself from God by sinning, that he could not have stolen himself more completely than he did, in making satisfaction he should so give himself to God, as that he could not possibly give himself more completely?

Boso. Nothing is more reasonable.

Anselm. Now, then: man can suffer nothing more painful or with greater difficulty for the honour of

God, willingly and not of debt, than death; and in no way can man more completely give himself to God, than when he delivers himself to death for His honour.

Boso. All this is true.

Anselm. He, therefore, who will make satisfaction for man's sin, must be such an one as shall have the power to die if he will.

Boso. I see clearly that the Man of whom we are inquiring must be one who shall neither die of necessity, since He is to be omnipotent, nor of debt, because He will never have been a sinner, and yet one who shall have the power of dying of His own free will, because that will be necessary [for the accomplishing of His undertaking, i. e. the redemption of man].

Anselm. There are also many other things which make it very desirable that He should have the likeness and habits of men without sin; but these appear of themselves more readily and with greater clearness in His life and actions than can, so to speak, before the trial be demonstrated by reason alone. For who will unfold to us how necessarily and how wisely it has been brought to pass, that He who was to redeem men, and by His doctrine to lead them from the way of death and perdition into the way of life and eternal blessedness, should have His conversation among men; and by that same conversation, while He taught them by word how they ought to live, give Himself for an example? But how could He have given Himself for an example to weak and mortal creatures, that they should not swerve from [the way of] righteousness for

injuries, or insults, or pains, or death, if they had not seen Him experience all these Himself?

CHAPTER XII.

THAT ALTHOUGH HE BE A PARTAKER OF OUR INFIRMITIES, YET HE IS NOT MISERABLE.

Boso. All these things clearly shew that He must be mortal, and a partaker of our infirmities. But all these are our miseries,—surely, therefore, He will be miserable.

Anselm. By no means: for as a convenience which one has against one's will does not form a necessary part of one's happiness, so it is not misery knowingly, and uncompelled by any necessity, to take upon one some inconvenience of one's free will.

Boso. Granted.

CHAPTER XIII.

THAT, TOGETHER WITH OUR OTHER INFIRMITIES, HE MAY NOT HAVE OUR IGNORANCE.

Boso. But in the likeness which He ought to have with men, tell me whether He is to have ignorance also, as He has our other infirmities?

Anselm. Why do you doubt of God's knowing all things?

Boso. Because, though He is to be immortal from

His divine, yet He is to be mortal from His human nature. Now, why may He not be like them—a man really ignorant, as He is to be really mortal?

Anselm. That taking of the manhood into unity of Person with the Godhead will only be wisely done by the supreme Wisdom. And so He will not take into the manhood what is in no way useful, but very prejudicial to the work which the same Manhood is to do. For ignorance would be useful to Him in nothing, but prejudicial in many things; for how is He to do so many and so great things as He has to do, without the greatest wisdom? or how are men to believe Him if they know He did not understand what He said? Even if they did not know, of what use would that ignorance be to Him?

Again, if nothing is loved except what is known, as there is to be nothing of good which He does not love, so there will be no good thing of which He is ignorant. Now what is good no one knows perfectly, except He who knows how to distinguish it from evil; this distinction also no one knows how to make who is ignorant of evil. Therefore, as He of whom we are speaking is to know perfectly every good thing, so there is no evil thing of which He will be ignorant. He will therefore have all knowledge, although He may not shew it publicly in His converse with men.

Boso. This appears to be, as you say, in His full age; but in infancy, as the fit time will not have come for wisdom to appear in Him, so there will be no need of it, and therefore it is not even fit that He should have it.

Anselm. Have I not said that this incarnation will

be effected with wisdom? Now as God will wisely take upon Him mortality, how wisely, because very usefully, will He make use of it! But ignorance He will not be able to take upon Him wisely, because it is never useful, but always prejudicial; unless, perhaps, when by it an evil will, which there never will be in Him, is restrained from carrying out its purpose. For although it sometimes may do no harm to anything else, yet in this alone it does harm, in that it takes away the good of knowledge; and, to cut short your inquiry, from the moment when that Man shall be in existence, He will be always as full of God as He will be of Himself, and consequently nothing will take place without His power, and might, and wisdom.

Boso. Although I did not doubt this always to have been the case with Christ, yet I asked the question in order to hear a reason for this also; for we are often certain of a thing, and yet do not know how to prove it by reason.

CHAPTER XIV.

HOW HIS DEATH CAN EXCEL THE NUMBER AND HEINOUSNESS OF THE SINS OF ALL MANKIND.

Boso. I ask you now to instruct me as to how His death can excel the number and heinousness of the sins of all mankind, when one (as we should think the least) sin you shew to be so infinite, as that if the number of worlds were infinitely multiplied, so as each to be as full of creatures as this world is, and if they

could not be saved from annihilation unless a man gave one look contrary to the will of God, yet it ought not to be given[1].

Anselm. If this Man were present, and you knew who He was, and one were to tell you, "Unless you kill this Man, this whole world, and whatsoever is not God, will perish," would you do it for the preservation of every other creature?

Boso. I would not; no, not if an infinite number of worlds were spread out before me.

Anselm. What if he were to tell you again: "Either slay Him, or all the sins of the world shall come upon you?"

Boso. I would answer, that I would rather bear all other sins, not only of this world, which have been and which shall be committed, but also all whatever can be conceived in addition to them, rather than this one only sin. And this answer I think I ought to make, not only in the question of His death, but of any the least harm which might happen to Him.

Anselm. You think rightly: but tell me why would your heart so judge as to shrink more from one sin in harming this Man, than from all other sins that can be conceived; since all sins whatever that have been committed are done against Him.

Boso. Because sin which is done against His Person is incomparably greater than all those which can be conceived of apart from His Person.

Anselm. What will you say to the fact that a man often suffers willingly some hardships in his person to avoid suffering greater in his property?

[1] See bk. I., chap. xxi., page 46.

Boso. I say that God, to whose power all things are subject, has no need to suffer such loss, just as you answered before to some question of mine.

Anselm. You answer right: we see, then, that to the violation of the bodily life of this Man no enormity or multitude of sins can be compared.

Boso. That is most clear.

Anselm. How great a good does it seem to you, if its cutting off is so great an evil?

Boso. If its existence be as great a good as its destruction is an evil, the good is incomparably greater than those sins are evil, all which, beyond comparison, the cutting off of His life excels.

Anselm. You say truly. Consider further, that sins are as hateful as they are evil, and that life is as precious as it is good. Hence it follows that that life is more precious than sins are hateful.

Boso. I cannot but see this.

Anselm. Do you suppose a thing so good and so precious is able to suffice for the payment of what is owing for the sins of the whole world?

Boso. Yes, and able to do infinitely more.

Anselm. You see, then, how this life may overmatch all sins, if it be given for them.

Boso. Clearly.

Anselm. If, then, to give life is to accept death, as the giving of this life excels all the sins of men, so also does the accepting death.

CHAPTER XV.

HOW THE SAME DEATH CAN BLOT OUT EVEN THE SINS OF HIS MURDERERS.

Boso. It is admitted to be so with all sins which do not touch the Person of God. But now I see another thing to be investigated. For if the evil of putting Him to death is as great as His life is good, how can His death over-match and blot out the sins of those who slew Him? Or if it blots out the sins of any of them, how can it fail to blot out the sins of all the rest of men as well? For we believe that even many of those have been saved, and that others without number will not be saved.

Anselm. This question the apostle answers by saying, that "had they known, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory[a]." For the difference is so great between a sin committed knowingly and one committed through ignorance, that the evil which they never could have done, on account of its excessive enormity, had it been known to them, is pardonable because it was done ignorantly. For to put God to death, no man ever, at least knowingly, could possibly wish to do; and so they who slew Him ignorantly did not plunge into that infinite sin to which no other sins can be compared. Now we considered its enormity in order to see how valuable that life was; not as to what His death would be if done ignorantly, but as if it should be done knowingly, which no man ever has done or could do.

Boso. You have given a reasonable proof that it was

[a] 1 Cor. ii. 8.

possible for the murderers of Christ to obtain pardon for their sin.

Anselm. What more do you ask now? For here you see how a reasonable necessity shews us that that heavenly city is to be perfected out of men, and that this cannot be done except by the remission of their sins, which no man can have except through a Man, who is at the same time God Himself, and who, by His death, reconciles men who are sinners to God. Clearly, then, we have found that Christ, whom we confess to be God and Man, has died for us; and we find, though this we knew before beyond all doubt, that all things that He says are certainly true, for God cannot lie, and that all things which He has done are wisely done must not be doubted, although the reason of them may not be understood by us.

Boso. It is true what you say; and I do not in the slightest degree doubt but that what He has said is true, or what He has done has been done with reason. But this I ask, that what in the Christian faith seems to unbelievers as though it were not right, or not possible to be done, you should shew me the reason why it may be right or possible; not to confirm me in the faith, but to delight me, being already confirmed with the understanding of the truth itself.

CHAPTER XVI.

HOW GOD, OUT OF THE SINFUL MASS, TOOK UPON HIM A MANHOOD WITHOUT SIN; AND OF THE SALVATION OF ADAM AND EVE.

Boso. Wherefore, as you have shewn me the reason of those things which have been mentioned above, so I beg you to point out to me the reason of what I am about to ask. First of all; how, out of a sinful mass, i.e. out of the human race, God took upon Him a manhood without sin, taking, as it were, the leaven out of the fermented bread. For although the mere conception of the said manhood may be pure, and free from all sin and carnal delight, yet the very Virgin of whom He was taken was conceived in iniquity, and in sin did her mother conceive her; she was, moreover, born in original sin, since she also sinned in Adam, in whom all have sinned.

Anselm. After it is agreed that that Man is God, and the Reconciler of sinners, there is no doubt of His being altogether without sin: now this He cannot be unless He be taken from the sinful mass without sin. But with what reason the wisdom of God did this, if we cannot understand we ought not to be surprised; but we ought with reverence to rest satisfied that there is something in the secret of so great a mystery which we know not. For God has remodelled human nature in a more wonderful manner than He modelled it at first, though both are equally easy to God; but man before his existence had not sinned, so as to make [this more wonderful work] necessary. But after that he was

made, by sinning he *merited* the loss of what he was, and what he was made for; although he might not entirely have lost what he had been made for, that there might be something left to be punished, or on which God might have mercy; for neither of these could have been if he had been annihilated. Therefore God reconstituted him so much more wonderfully than He constituted him at first, as He did the one out of a sinner contrary to his deserts, and the other not of a sinner nor contrary to desert. Again, how great a mystery is it that God and Man should meet in one Person, so as, keeping the integrity of either nature, the same Person should be Man who is God. Who, then, can presume even to conceive that human intellect can fathom how wisely and how wonderfully so inscrutable a work can be done?

Boso. I allow that no man can in this life fully unfold such a mystery; and I do not ask you to do what no man can do, but only to do as much as you can: for you will more persuade me that in this matter deeper reasons lie concealed if you shew that you see some reason, than if, by saying nothing, you prove yourself to see no reason in it.

Anselm. I see that I cannot rid myself of your importunity; so if in any way I shall be able to shew what you ask, we will give God the praise: but if I shall not be able, what has been proved above shall suffice.

Now since it is agreed that it was necessary for God to become man, there is no doubt but that He is not wanting in wisdom and power to do this without sin.

Boso. I willingly take it so.

Anselm. It was necessary, too, that this redemption which Christ made should profit not only those who lived at that time, but others. Now suppose there were a king against whom all the people of some city of his have so sinned, except one only, who is yet of their race; that no one of them could do anything by which he might escape the sentence of death . he, however, who alone is innocent, has such favour with the king that he can, and such great love toward the guilty that he will reconcile all who take his advice by some service which shall be very pleasing to the king himself, and which he is to do on a day fixed by the king's will. And since all who are to be reconciled cannot meet him on that day, the king grants, in consideration of the greatness of this service, that all who, either before or after that day, shall have confessed that they are desirous of pardon through that work which is to be done on that day, and accede to the agreement there made, that they are absolved from all past crime; and if it shall happen that after this pardon they sin again, if they will forthwith make due satisfaction and amend themselves that they shall, through the efficacy of the same agreement, again receive pardon: and yet [the king decrees] that no one of them shall enter his palace until this, by which their crimes are to be forgiven them, has been accomplished.

Now in like manner to this, since all the men who were to be saved could not be present when Christ accomplished that redemption, the efficacy of His death was such that even to the absent, both in place and time, its effect extends. Moreover, that it should profit not only those present is easily perceived from

the fact that there could not be so many present at His death as are necessary to the constitution of the heavenly city, even if all who were in existence (wheresoever they might be) at the time of His death were made partakers of that redemption. For there were more demons living at that day than there were men, out of whom the number of lost demons is to be made up[b]. And we must not suppose that from the period when man was created there was any time in which this world of ours, with the creatures which were made for the use of men, had been so empty as that in it there had been no one of the human race belonging to that kingdom for which man was formed. For it seems inconsistent that God should have permitted the human race, and all that He created for the use of those out of whom the heavenly kingdom is to be perfected, to exist in vain even for a single moment. Now they might in some way seem to exist in vain so long as they did not subserve the end for which they were made.

Boso. By a parity of reasoning, which nothing seems to oppose, you shew that there never was a time, from the period when man was created, without some person who had part in that reconciliation without which every man had been made in vain, and that we may conclude this to be not only consistent, but even necessary. For if this be more consistent and reasonable than that at some time there was no one in whom the intention of God in making man should be accomplished, there is nothing else to oppose the conclusion

[b] Reference is here made to Bk. I. chap. xviii., the chapter which has been omitted in this translation.

that it is necessary that there should have been always some one having part in the foretold reconciliation. Hence it cannot be doubted that Adam and Eve had part in that redemption, although divine authority does not plainly pronounce this.

Anselm. It also seems incredible, when God made them, and immutably purposed to make out of them all the men whom He should exalt into the heavenly kingdom, that He should exclude those two from His purpose.

Boso. Yes, we should suppose that He made them especially to be of those for the sake of whom they were created.

Anselm. You reason well. Still no soul could, before the death of Christ, have entered the heavenly paradise; like as I said just now of the king's palace.

Boso. So we hold.

Anselm. Again, that Virgin, of whom the Man whom we are speaking of was taken, was of those who, before His nativity, were through Him purified from their sins; and in that same purity of hers He was formed of her.

Boso. What you say would please me much, except that, whereas He ought to have purity from sin of Himself, He appears to have it of His Mother, and to be pure, not through Himself, but through her.

Anselm. It is not so. But since the purity of His Mother, through whom He is pure, was only from Him, He also through Himself and of Himself was pure.

CHAPTER XVII.

HOW HE DID NOT DIE OF NECESSITY, ALTHOUGH HE COULD NOT HAVE EXISTED EXCEPT HE HAD BEEN GOING TO DIE.

Boso. This point is well, so far. But now a further question strikes me. For we said just now that He was not to die of necessity, and now we see that His Mother was made pure by His death that was to be; but unless she had been, He Himself could not have been born of her. How then was it that He did not die from necessity, when, unless He had been going to die, He could not have existed? For if He had not been going to die, the Virgin of whom He was taken would not have been pure, (since this she could never have been except by believing in His real death,) nor could He in any way have been taken of her. Wherefore, if He did not die of necessity after He was formed of the Virgin, He could not be formed of the Virgin after He *had* been formed, for it is not possible.

Anselm. If you had well considered what was said just now, you would then, I think, have seen your question answered.

Boso. I do not see how.

Anselm. Did we not, when we inquired whether He had the power of lying, shew that in lying there are two powers; viz., one, that of wishing to lie, the other, that of lying; and since, though He had the power of lying, yet He had it from Himself that He could not wish to lie; and on this account He ought to be praised for His own righteousness by which He kept the truth?

Boso. So He ought.

Anselm. Similarly, in preserving life, there is the power of wishing to preserve, and the power of preserving it. When, then, one asks whether the same God-man could have preserved His life so as never to have died, we cannot doubt but that He always had the power of preserving it, although He could not have wished to preserve it so as never to have died. And since He had this (viz. that He could not have wished) from Himself, therefore He laid down His life, not of necessity, but of free power.

Boso. Those powers (of lying, I mean, and preserving life,) were not altogether alike in Him. For in the former case it follows that, if He wished, He had the power of lying; but in the latter it seems that, if He had not wished to die, He had no more power than He had of not being what He was. For to this end was He Man, that He should die; and on account of her faith in His death that was to take place, He was able to be taken of the Virgin, as you said above.

Anselm. Just as you suppose that He had not the power of not dying, or that He died of necessity, because He could not cease to be what He was, so you may assert that He had not the power of not wishing to die, or that He did of necessity wish to die, since what He was He could not cease to be; for He was not made Man to the end that He should die, any more than that He should wish to die: wherefore, as you ought not to say that He could not possibly not have wished to die, or that He did of necessity wish to die, so you must not say that He could not possibly not have died, or that He died of necessity.

Boso. Certainly, they are subject to the same reason-

ing, both to die and to wish to die; both appear to have been in His case of necessity.

Anselm. Who was it who of His own accord willed to make Himself man, so that by the same unchangeable will He might die, and that by faith in this certainty the Virgin, of whom that Man was taken, might be made pure?

Boso. God, the Son of God.

Anselm. Has it not been proved above that the will of God is forced by no necessity, but that it preserves itself in its own free unchangeableness, when it is said to do a thing of necessity?

Boso. Yes, it was indeed so proved. But we see, on the contrary, that what God unchangeably wills cannot possibly not be, but it is necessary for it to be: wherefore, if God willed that this Man should die, He could not possibly not have died.

Anselm. From the fact that the Son of God took upon Him manhood from the wish that He might die, you prove that the same Manhood could not have died.

Boso. So I understand it.

Anselm. Did it not likewise appear from what has been said, that the Son of God and the assumed Manhood are one and the same Person, in order that the same may be God and Man, Son of God and Son of the Virgin?

Boso. Even so.

Anselm. The same Man, then, could not possibly have not died, and yet be dead.

Boso. I cannot say that He could.

Anselm. Now since God's will does a thing by no necessity, but by its own power, and that Man's will

was the will of God, therefore He died by no necessity, but by His own power alone.

Boso. I cannot withstand your logical conclusions, for I can in no way weaken either the premises which you propose, or the consequences which you draw from them. But yet what I have mentioned always meets me, viz., that even if He wished not to die, He could not possibly have not died, any more than He could not possibly not be what He was, for He was really going to die; since, if He had not been really going to die, there could not have been true faith in His death that was going to take place, and it was through this faith that that Virgin of whom He was born, and many others, were purified from sin. Now if this faith had not been true, it could have profited nothing. Wherefore, if He could by any possibility not have died, He could have made that to be not true which was true.

Anselm. Why was it true before He died that He was going to die?

Boso. Because He Himself, of His own accord and by His unchangeable will, willed it so.

Anselm. If then, as you say, He could not possibly not have died, on the account that He was really and truly going to die,—and He was really and truly going to die, because He had of His own accord and unchangeably so willed it,—it follows that He could not possibly not have died for no other reason than that by His unchangeable will He willed to die.

Boso. Just so: but whatever may have been the cause, it is nevertheless true that He could not possibly not have died, and there was a necessity for Him to die.

Anselm. You make much ado about nothing, and (as they say), you stumble upon plain ground [c].

Boso. Do you forget what I met your excuses with at the commencement of this discussion of ours; viz. that you were to do what I asked you, not for the learned, but for me, and those who, with me, begged it of you? Bear, then, with our inquiring in the slowness and dulness of our intellects, so long as you satisfy me and them as you began to do even in our childish questions.

CHAPTER XVIII.

THAT WITH GOD THERE IS NO NECESSITY OR IMPOSSIBILITY, AND THAT THERE IS A NECESSITY WHICH COMPELS, AND A NECESSITY WHICH DOES NOT.

Anselm. We said just now that it is not correct to say that God cannot do a thing, or that He does it from necessity: for every necessity and impossibility is subject to His will. Now His will can yield to no necessity or impossibility: for nothing is necessary or impossible except because He so wills it. But that He should will a thing to be, or not to be, on account of necessity or impossibility, is contrary to the truth of His nature. Wherefore, (since all that He wills, and only what He wills, He does,) as no necessity or impossibility precedes His willing a thing to be or not to be, so neither does it precede His doing or not doing it, although He may unchangeably will and do many things. And as when God does a thing, after it has

[c] "Nimis hæres in nihilo; et (ut dici solet) quæris nodum in scirpo." —[*Terent. And.* 5, 4, 39.]

been done there is no longer a possibility of its not being done, but it is always true that it has been done; and yet it is not right to say that it is impossible for God to make what is past not past; for there no necessity of not doing it, or impossibility of doing it, operates, but the simple will of God, who wills that truth should always (since He Himself is Truth) be as unchangeable as He is: so if He purposes that He will unchangeably do a thing, although what He purposes could not, before it is done, possibly not be done, still there is not in Him any necessity of doing it, or impossibility of not doing it, because the only thing that operates with Him is His will.

For instance, when it is often said that God *cannot* there is no denial of *power* in Him, but there is signified invincible power and might; and nothing is meant but that no possible thing can bring it to pass that He should do what it is said He *cannot*. Now it is a very common phrase to say that a thing *can*, not because the power is in it, but in something else, and that it *cannot*, not because the want of power is in it, but in some other thing. For instance, we say, "that man can be conquered," instead of, "some one can conquer him;" and "the other cannot be conquered," instead of, "no one can conquer him." For to be able to be conquered is not power, but want of power; and not to be able to be conquered is not want of power, but power. And we do not say that God does a thing from necessity, as though in *Him* there were any necessity, but because there is in another, as I said of want of power, when it is said that "He cannot." For every necessity is either compulsion or prohibition; and these two necessities are

directly opposed one to the other, as are "must" and "impossible." For instance, whatever is compelled to be, is prohibited from not being; and whatever is compelled not to be, is prohibited from being; even as what must be is impossible not to be: and what must not be is impossible to be, and conversely. Now when we say that a thing must be or not be with God, it is not meant that there is with Him any necessity either compelling or prohibiting; but it is intended to express that in all other things there is a necessity prohibiting them from doing and compelling them not to do, contrary to what is spoken of with reference to God. For when we say that God must always speak the truth, and that it is impossible for Him ever to lie, nothing else is said but that it is impossible that anything can make Him either not speak the truth or lie.

Wherefore, when we say that this Man, who in the unity of Person (as was said above) is the selfsame as God, the Son of God, could not possibly not have died, or have wished not to die, after He was born of the Virgin, it is not intended to express that there was in Him any want of power of preserving, or of wishing to preserve, His own life from death; but that there was an unchangeableness in that will of His by which He, of His own accord, made Himself Man, to the end that, persevering in the same will, He might die; and that nothing could have changed that will. For it would have been more the want of power than real power if He could have wished to lie, or to deceive, or to change His will, which beforehand He willed should be unchangeable.

And if (as I said above), when a man of his own

accord proposes to do some good thing, and with the same will afterwards does what he proposed, although he might be compelled, if he refused, to fulfil his promise, yet we must not say that what he does he does of necessity, but of the same free will with which he proposed it. For one ought not to say a thing is done or not done from necessity or want of power, when neither necessity nor want of power have anything to do with it, but only will. If, I say, it is so with man, much less are necessity or want of power to be even named with God, who does nothing but what He wills, and whose will no force can compel or prohibit. For in this is the value of the diversity of natures in Christ, and the unity of Person; that what had to be done for the restoration of men, if the human nature could not do it, the divine nature might; and if a thing was by no means consistent with the divine, the human nature might exhibit it, and not be one and another Person, but the selfsame, who being both perfectly, might through His human nature pay what it owed, and by His divine nature be able to pay what it was expedient should be paid.

In fact, the Virgin, who was through faith made pure, so that He could be taken of her, by no means believed that He was going to die except because He willed it, as she had been taught of the prophet, who said of Him, "He was offered because He Himself willed it," (*Oblatus est quia ipse voluit.* Is. liii. 7. Vulg.) Wherefore, since her faith was true, it was necessary that it should be as she believed.

But if it again troubles you that I say "it was necessary," remember that the truth of the Virgin's faith was not the reason why He died voluntarily, but

because this was to be the case, therefore her faith was true. Wherefore, if it be said, It was necessary that He should die of His own will alone, because her faith, or the prophecies which went before on this point, were true; this is just the same as your saying, It had been necessary for it to be so, since so it would be; but a necessity of this kind does not compel the fact to exist, but the existence of the fact creates the necessity. For there is a necessity going before which is the cause of the fact taking place; and there is a necessity coming after, which the fact creates. There is a necessity going before and efficient, when it is said, "the earth revolves, because it must revolve [d]." But there is a necessity coming after and of no effect, but simply existing, when I tell you "you must speak, because you are speaking." For when I tell you this, I mean that nothing can bring it to pass that you cannot speak while you are speaking, not that any one compels you to speak. Now the force of its natural condition compels the earth to revolve, but no necessity makes you speak. But whereas there is a necessity going before, there is also one coming after; though where there is one coming after, there is not by reason thereof one going before. For instance, we may say, "the earth must revolve, because it is revolving;" but it is not likewise true that the reason why you are speaking is because you must speak. This necessity coming after the fact runs through all times; thus, Whatever has been must have been; whatever is, must be; whatever is to be, must have been going to be.

This is that necessity which (where Aristotle treats

[d] Modern astronomy justifies us in rendering *cælum volvitur* by "the earth revolves."

of singular and future propositions), seems to pull down and to build up everything "of necessity." By this necessity coming after and having no effect upon the fact, since the Virgin's faith, or the prophecy concerning Christ, that He was going (of His own will and not of necessity) to die, was true; it was necessary that so it should be: by this necessity He was made Man: by this He did and suffered whatever He did and suffered; by this He willed whatsoever He did will. For these were so of necessity because they were to be; and were to be because they have been; and have been because they have; and if you will know the true necessity of all that He did and suffered, know, then, that all these were "of necessity" because He Himself willed them. But His will no necessity preceded. Wherefore, if they have taken place only because He willed them to do so, they would not if He had willed them not. So, therefore, *no man took His life from Him, but He Himself laid it down and took it again;* because *He had power to lay down His life, and power to take it again*, as He Himself said.

Boso. You have satisfied me that He cannot be proved to have submitted to death by any necessity; and I am not sorry that I was so troublesome in begging you to do this.

Anselm. We have shewn, I think, one sure way of accounting for the manner in which God has taken upon Him out of the sinful mass a Manhood without sin; but it cannot, I imagine, be denied but that there is some other besides the one we have mentioned, for there is this, viz., that God is able to do what man's reason is not able to comprehend. However, since even that one seems sufficient for me,

and if I wished now to search out another, I should be obliged to investigate the nature of original sin, and how from our first parents it is diffused through the whole human race, excepting Him of whom we are treating, and to touch upon certain other questions which demand a treatise of their own [e]; let us, therefore, be content with that reason which we have mentioned, and finish what remains of the task we have commenced.

Boso. As you will; but on the understanding that some time, God helping you, you will hold yourself bound to unravel that other reason which you now shrink from investigating.

Anselm. I do not refuse, since I know I have the wish to do what you ask; but as I am uncertain of the future, I dare not promise, but commit it to God's disposal. But tell me now of the question which you proposed at first, and for the sake of which so many others have been piled upon each other, what part of it seems to you to have been solved, [and what is there of it now to be solved]?

Boso. The root of the question was, "Why was God made Man, in order that by His death He might save men," when it appears as though He might have done this in some other way?

This you answered by many and necessary arguments, and shewed that the restoration of the human race ought not to have been left uncompleted; and that it could not have been accomplished, unless man paid what he owed to God for his sin; and this debt was so great that, although no one ought to have paid it except

[e] This forms the subject of the author's treatise, *De Virginali Conceptu et Originali Peccato*, written during his banishment from England.

man, no one could except God, so that the same Person should be Man who is also God. And hence it was necessary that God should take Manhood into oneness of Person, so that he who by nature ought to have paid and could not, might be in a Person which could pay.

Secondly, you shewed that, out of a Virgin, and of the Person of the Son of God, was to be taken that Man who should also be God; and you proved how He might without sin be taken from the sinful mass. Now you have proved the life of this Man to be evidently so exalted and so precious, that it is *able* to suffice to pay what is owing for the sins of the whole world, and infinitely more too.

It remains now to shew how this Life *is* paid to God for the sins of men.

CHAPTER XIX.

HOW THE LIFE OF CHRIST IS PAID TO GOD FOR THE SINS OF MEN; AND HOW CHRIST WAS AND WAS NOT BOUND TO SUFFER.

Anselm. If for righteousness' sake He permitted Himself to be slain, did He not give His life for the honour of God?

Boso. If I can comprehend what I do not doubt, I will confess that, although I may not see how He has done this with reason, (when He had the power of keeping righteousness unfailingly, and also of keeping His own life for ever,) still I will confess that He gave of His own accord to God for His honour, something to which nothing that is not God can be compared, and which is able to compensate for all the debts of all men.

Anselm. Do you not see that when He bore with calm patience the injuries, and insults, and the death of the Cross with the thieves, brought on Him on account of His righteousness which He obediently kept, He gave an example to men, that they should swerve from the righteousness which they owe to God for no inconveniences which they may experience; and this He would by no means have given, if, (as He could have done,) He had refused death brought on Him for such a cause?

Boso. It seems that there was no necessity for *Him* to give this example; for many before His coming, and St. John the Baptist after His coming and before His death, by bravely suffering death for the truth, are known to have given a sufficient example of that.

Anselm. No man besides Him ever gave to God by dying what he would not at some time be compelled to lose; or ever paid, what he did not owe. But He, of His own accord, offered to the Father what He would not have ever been compelled to lose; and He paid for sinners what He did not owe for Himself. Wherefore, He gave a much greater example that each one should not hesitate, when reason requires it, to surrender of himself to God that which he will some time lose against his will: Who, when He in no way needed it for Himself, or was obliged to do it for others, (to whom He [as God] owed nothing but punishment,) gave so precious a life, yea, *Himself* even so great a Person, with such a ready will.

Boso. You come very near to what I desire; but suffer me to ask something which, although you may, perhaps, think me silly to ask it, is yet not a question which I could readily answer if it were asked me.

You say that when He died He gave what He did not owe. But no one will deny that, when He gave this example in such a way, He acted better, and pleased God more by it, than if He had not done this; or will say that it was not His duty to do what He knew was better and would please God more. How, then, shall we assert that He did not owe to God what He did, that is, what He knew was better and would please God more, especially when the creature owes to God all that it is, and that it knows, and that it is able to do?

Anselm. Although the creature has nothing from itself, yet when God grants him liberty to do, or not to do, a thing, He gives him both to be so far his own, that although one may be better than the other, yet neither is distinctly required; but whether he does the one that is best, or the other, he is said to do his duty in what he does; and if he does that which is best, he has a reward, because he voluntarily gives what is his own. For although virginity is better than matrimony[f], yet neither is distinctly required of man; but both he who chooses to use matrimony, and he who chooses to keep his virginity, is said to do his duty in what he does. For no one says that he ought not to choose virginity or marriage; but we say that what a man chooses before he decides upon any of these things, that he ought to do; and if he keeps his virginity for the voluntary offering which he makes to God, he looks forward to a reward. Therefore, when you say that a creature owes to God what it knows to be best and is able to do, if you mean that he owes it of debt, and do not understand "if God

[f] "He that giveth her in marriage doeth well; but he that giveth her not in marriage doeth better." 1 Cor. vii. 38.

commands it," it is not always true. Since, as I have said, man is not bound in debt to virginity; but if he so choose, he is bound to use marriage.

But if the word "ought," or "is bound," or "owes" [*debet*] troubles you, and you cannot understand it apart from some debt, remember that as it sometimes happens that "can," and "cannot," and "necessity" are used, not because they exist in the matters they are used in connexion with, but because they exist in some other case; so also is [*debere*] "ought." For instance, when we say that "the poor *ought* to receive alms from the rich," this is the same as that "the rich *ought* to give alms to the poor;" for this is a duty [*debitum*] required not of the poor but of the rich. It is said also that "God *ought* to be above all," not that He is in any way a *debtor* in this case; but because all things *ought* to be subject to Him, and *ought* to do what He wills, since what He wills *ought* to be. So when any creature pleases to do what is his own either to do or not to do, he is said to do what he ought [*debere facere*], because what he wills *ought* to be. And so the Lord Jesus, when He willed (as we said) to suffer death, since it was His own either to suffer or not to suffer, *ought* to have done what He did, because what He willed *ought* to have been done.

For seeing that He is at once God and Man, according to His human nature by which He was Man, He received from the divine nature, (which is distinct from His human nature,) the property that whatever He had was His own, so that He was bound [*deberet*] to give nothing but what He willed; and yet by His [unity of] Person, He so had whatever He possessed from Himself,

and was so perfectly sufficient for Himself, that neither did He owe any recompense to another, nor had He need to give, that He might recompense Himself.

Boso. I see now, plainly, that He gave Himself to death for the honour of God in no way because He was bound to do so, as my reasoning seemed to indicate; and yet He ought to have done what He did.

Anselm. That honour, indeed, belongs to the whole Trinity; wherefore, since He is at once God the Son of God, He offered Himself for His own honour to Himself, even as to the Father, and to the Holy Ghost; that is, His Manhood to His Godhead, which is, at the same time, One of the Three Persons. However, that we may (keeping in the selfsame truth), say what we wish more clearly, let us say, as is usual, That the Son offered Himself of His own will to the Father, since in this way it is most clearly stated, both that the whole Godhead is understood to be in one Person, to whom He offered Himself according to His Manhood; and by the [mention of the] Name of the Father and the Son, a certain incomprehensible devotion is experienced in the hearts of the hearers, when the Son is said in this way to entreat the Father for us.

Boso. This I most willingly admit.

CHAPTER XX.

FOR WHAT REASON THE SALVATION OF MAN FOLLOWS FROM HIS DEATH.

Anselm. Let us now see, as far as we can, for what great reason the salvation of man follows from this.

Boso. To this my heart leads me; for although I think I understand it, yet I should like to have the same chain of reasoning brought out by you.

Anselm. Well, there is no need to explain how great a thing it was that the Son voluntarily gave.

Boso. No; it is sufficiently clear.

Anselm. Well, then, you will not be of opinion that He who voluntarily gives so great a gift, ought to go without a recompense?

Boso. No; I see that the Father must recompense the Son; otherwise, either He would seem unjust if He would not, or powerless if He could not: both which are contrary to the nature of the Godhead.

Anselm. He who recompenses any one, either gives what that one has not got, or forgives what may be required of him. Now before that the Son did so great an action, all things which the Father had were His; neither did He ever owe what might be forgiven Him. What recompense, then, is to be given to one who is in want of nothing, and to whom there is nothing which can be given or forgiven?

Boso. On the one hand I see the necessity of recompensing Him, and on the other its impossibility; for it is at once necessary for God to pay what He owes, and there is no one to pay it to.

Anselm. If so great and so due a recompense is paid neither to Him nor to any one else, the Son will appear to have done so great an action in vain.

Boso. It is wicked to suppose this.

Anselm. It must, then, be paid to some one else, since it cannot be to Him.

Boso. This is the inevit[illegible]quence.

Anselm. If the Son wished to give what is due to Him to another, could the Father justly prevent Him, or refuse that other to whom He pleases to give it?

Boso. No; I see it is both just and necessary that it should be paid by the Father to whomsoever the Son pleases to give it; because it is both lawful for the Son to give what is His own, and the Father cannot pay what He owes *Him* except to some one else.

Anselm. On whom should He more consistently bestow the fruit and recompense of His own death, than on those for the sake of saving whom (as the reasoning of truth has taught us), He became Man, and to whom (as we said), by dying, He set an example of dying for righteousness' sake; for in vain will they be followers of Him if they are not partakers of His merits? Or, whom may He more justly make inheritors of what is due to Him, (of which He is not in want Himself,) and of the superabundance of His fulness, than His own parents and brethren, whom He sees encumbered with so many and such heavy debts, pining away with want in the depth of misery; so that what they owe for their sins may be forgiven them, and that of which (by reason of their sins) they stand in need, may be given them?

Boso. The whole world can hear nothing more reasonable, nothing more comforting, nothing more desirable. For my part, I take such confidence from it, that I cannot tell you with what joy my heart is gladdened. For it seems to me as though God can reject no man coming to Him in this Name.

Anselm. True, if he comes as he ought. But by what means we must [illegible] be made partakers of so

great grace, and how we must live in it, we are taught in every part of Holy Scripture, which is founded on solid truth, and which we have in some sort, God helping us, seen to be built on a firm foundation.

Boso. Yes, indeed, whatever is built upon this foundation is founded on a solid rock.

Anselm. I think I have now somewhat answered your question, although I might be able to do this better more at length; and there are reasons of this fact greater and more numerous than either mine or any mortal intellect can comprehend.

It is also clear that God stood in no need of doing what we have said, but that so His unchangeable truth required it; for although what that Man did God is said to have done on account of the unity of Person, yet God did not require to come down from heaven to overcome the devil, or to contend against him by righteousness to deliver man[g]; but God did require of man that he should overcome the devil, and that he who had offended God by sin should make satisfaction by righteousness. Forasmuch as God owed the devil nothing except punishment, so neither did man [owe him anything] except that, as he had been overcome by him, he should overcome him again in turn; but whatever was required of him, this he owed to God, and not to the devil.

[g] See Book I. chap. vii., where *Boso* appears to suppose these to be the principal reasons for the Incarnation.

CHAPTER XXI.

HOW GREAT AND HOW JUST IS THE MERCY OF GOD.

Anselm. We find, now, that the mercy of God, which seemed to you to disappear when we considered the justice of God and the sin of man, is so great, and so consistent with justice, that we can think of nothing greater or more just. For what can be conceived more merciful, than, when the sinner has been condemned to eternal torments, and has nothing by which to redeem himself, God says, "Take My Only-begotten Son, and give Him for thyself:" and the Son Himself says, "Offer Me and redeem thyself?" For They do, as it were, say this when They call us and lead us to the Christian Faith. Again, what can be conceived more just than that He to whom is offered a Price greater than all the debt, should, if it be offered with the due disposition, forgive the whole debt?

CHAPTER XXII.

THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE DEVIL TO BE RECONCILED.

Anselm. Now the reconciliation of the devil, of which you inquired[h], you will see to be impossible, if you carefully consider that of man. For as man could not have been reconciled except by the Man-God, who could die, and by whose righteousness what God had lost by man's sin, would be restored; so the condemned angels cannot be saved except by an Angel-God, who

[h] Book I. chap. xvii.

might die, and who by His own righteousness might make up to God that of which the sins of the others had robbed Him. And as it would not have been right for man to have been restored through another man who was not of the same race, though he might be of the same nature; so it would not be right for any angel to be saved through another angel, though all were of one nature, because they are not, as men are, of the same race; for all angels are not so from one angel, as all men are from one man. This, again, stands in the way of the restoration, that as they fell, when no one else tempted them to fall, so they ought to rise again with no one else's help; and this is impossible for them. For otherwise they cannot be restored to the dignity which they would have had; since they would, without any external assistance, by their own power which they had received, have, (if they had not sinned,) stood fast in the truth. Wherefore, if any one imagines that our Saviour's Redemption ought some time to be extended even to them, he is convicted by reason itself of being unreasonably deceived. And this I do not say as though the value of His death did not in its magnitude far excel all the sins of men and of angels, but because a reason that cannot be altered steadily opposes the restoration of the lost angels.

CHAPTER XXIII.

THAT BY WHAT HAS BEEN SAID THE TRUTH OF THE OLD AND NEW TESTAMENTS IS PROVED.

Boso. All that you say appears to me rational, and what nothing can contradict; and by the solution of

the single question which we proposed, I see is proved whatever is contained in the New and Old Testaments. For when you thus prove that God must necessarily have been made Man, even if a few things which you brought forward be taken out of our Books (as what you touched upon of the Three Persons of the Godhead, and of Adam), you would satisfy not only Jews, but even Pagans, by reason alone; and the same God-Man proves the New Testament, and proves the truth of the Old; so that as it must needs be confessed that He is true, no one can refuse to confess that everything that is contained in them is true also.

Anselm. If we have said anything which ought to be corrected, Ido not refuse correction, if it be done with reason. But if what we think we have discovered by reason be confirmed by the Testimony of the Truth, then we ought to attribute it not to ourselves, but to God who is blessed for ever. Amen.

DEO GRATIAS.

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